Patents of Damocles by Leslie, Christopher R.
Indiana Law Journal




New York University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation





For centuries, military thinkers have long-recognized that weapons need not
actually be fired in order to have a deterrent effect on one's enemies. The build-up
of navies, maintenance of large standing armies, and nuclear deterrence all reflect
this simple insight. Outside of military contexts, the weapon need not even be
actually displayed in order to have the desired effect, such as the bank robber who
pats his pocket menacingly but never actually brandishes a gun. Taking a page
from military strategy, many patentholders have also realized that patents can be
used as weapons against competitive rivals even without actually enforcing one's
patent rights in court. Like the mythical Sword of Damocles, these patents hang
over the head of any potential entrant into the market.
Over four decades ago, the Supreme Court in Walker Process recognized that
the fraudulent procurement and enforcement of a patent can-if the remaining
elements are satisfied-violate antitrust's prohibition on illegal monopolization.
However, courts have narrowly defined "patent enforcement" to mean infringement
litigation, which permits monopolists with fraudulently procured patents to illegally
monopolize markets while evading antitrust liability so long as they do not
explicitly threaten competitors with infringement lawsuits. While there is nothing
suspicious about patentholders efficiently using the mere existence of their patents
to deter infringement, when the patentee has acquired its intellectual property rights
through fraud the ability to exclude competitors without explicitly threatening a
lawsuit allows firms to engage in patent fraud while insulating their fraudulently
procured patent from legal scrutiny. This Article explains how the current
constricted conception of patent enforcement undermines this important antitrust
cause of action and seriously weakens both competitive markets and the patent
system as well.
Part I of this Article explores the balance between antitrust and patent law.
While Section Two of the Sherman Act generally condemns monopolies as
inefficient and anti-consumer, antitrust law tolerates monopolies created by patents
in order to foster innovation. Fraudulently procured patents distort this balance
because they injure competition without any countervailing virtues. Recognizing
this anti-competitive threat, the Supreme Court in Walker Process held that a
monopolist's fraudulent procurement of a patent can create antitrust liability,
provided that the remaining elements of a Section Two claim are established.
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However, Walker Process required that the monopolist actually enforce its
fraudulently procured patent in order to be liable for an antitrust violation.
Part II discusses this enforcement requirement in antitrust cases based on
fraudulently procured patents. This Part exposes two problems with current Walker
Process jurisprudence regarding enforcement issues. First, what constitutes "patent
enforcement" is not particularly well-defined. Second, to the extent that courts have
defined the concept, the current definition is overly narrow, focusing solely on the
filing of infringement litigation and explicit threats to file such lawsuits.
Part II argues that the concept of patent enforcement in antitrust litigation
should be broadly interpreted to include more than simply initiating or explicitly
threatening to initiate litigation. In particular, this Part considers whether each of
the following activities constitutes enforcement: publicly flaunting one's patent,
stating a general intent to sue infringers, accusing competitors of infringement,
threatening competitors' business partners, and licensing activities. This Part
explains how, in some markets, each of these actions can increase the exclusionary
power of a fraudulently procured patent, yet courts hold that such conduct does not
constitute enforcement sufficient to create liability for illegal monopolization under
Walker Process.
Part IV explains that the activities considered in Part I do not automatically
rise to the level of patent enforcement necessary to find that a monopolist with a
fraudulently procured patent has violated Section Two of the Sherman Act. Rather,
whether the monopolist's conduct constitutes such patent enforcement is a function
of context.
Part V argues that expanding the definition of patent enforcement for purposes
of Walker Process litigation is an effective approach to exposing fraudulently
procured patents and deterring illegal monopolization. Currently, patent fraud can
be cost-beneficial because a monopolist with a fraudulently procured patent can
strategically deploy the exclusionary power of the patent against competitors (and
potential competitors) while shielding the patent from judicial scrutiny and the
monopolist from antitrust liability. By reconceiving the contours of what
constitutes patent enforcement, antitrust litigation can render patent fraud less
attractive to monopolists. Furthermore, antitrust is the appropriate body of law to
solve the problem because it focuses on those patents most likely to cause harm and
it provides more appropriate remedies than can patent law. Finally, antitrust law
has many filters that protect innocent patentholders. In order to establish Section
Two liability under a Walker Process or Handgards theory of recovery, the
antitrust plaintiff must prove that the defendant had monopoly power, that that
market power is a result of the challenged patent, that the patent was fraudulently
procured, and that the plaintiff suffered antitrust injury and had antitrust standing.
Each element protects the honest patentee against an inaccurate finding of antitrust
liability.
I. ANTITRUST LAW AND FRAUDULENTLY PROCURED PATENTS
Section Two of the Sherman Act condemns the acquisition of monopoly power
through predatory conduct by dominant firms. Monopolization injures both
consumers and the efficiency of a competitive marketplace. A firm with monopoly
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power possesses the ability to raise price and to exclude competitors.' A
monopolist maximizes its profits by reducing output while increasing price. As the
available quantity of a given product decreases, the market price increases, with
sales being made only to those consumers who have relatively high reservation
prices. The monopolist makes fewer sales but earns more profit on each
transaction, thereby increasing its overall bottom line. In contrast, all consumers are
worse off-those consumers who continue to purchase the product must pay a
higher price, while other consumers are denied the product altogether.
In addition to the harms to consumers who could afford to purchase the product
at the competitive price, monopolization also reduces efficiency. By reducing
output below the efficient market equilibrium, monopoly pricing creates
deadweight loss. Deadweight loss refers to the forgone social benefit associated
with the sales that did not take place because the monopolist constrained output.
Each of the excluded consumers was willing to pay more for the good than its cost
of production. But the monopolist declines these socially beneficial sales in order to
charge a higher price on the remaining sales. Even antitrust commentators who are
generally unconcerned about higher prices denounce the imposition of deadweight
loss associated with monopolies.2
For the monopolist's strategy to work, the monopolist must be able to exclude
competitors who would otherwise expand output to satisfy the unmet consumer
demand and thus drive price back down to its competitive levels. Most scholarly
debate about illegal monopolization focuses on how a monopolist has excluded its
competitors; Section Two of the Sherman Act does not condemn all monopolies,
only those achieved or maintained through anticompetitive or predatory conduct.
Thus, a dominant firm that achieves its monopoly power through "superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident" does not run afoul of the antitrust laws.
3
Antitrust liability for illegal monopolization requires the plaintiff to prove that the
monopolist achieved or maintained that power through illegal exclusionary
conduct. In contrast, an antitrust defendant will seek to show that-even if it does
possess monopoly power-it has acquired that market power legitimately.
One way in which a firm might legally achieve monopoly power is by obtaining
a patent on a desirable product or process. When a firm acquires a patent, it secures
"the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United
States" during the life of the patent.4 This bundle of exclusionary rights does not
necessarily give the patentee monopoly power. While older court cases often
referred to "patent monopolies," 5 courts now recognize that most patents do not
confer any market power, 6 because either there is no demand for the patented
product or there are noninfringing substitutes. However, a substantial minority of
1. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
2. See William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L.
REv. 652, 653 (1983).
3. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(l)-(2) (2000).
5. E.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 6-9 (1966).
6. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
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patents are quite valuable. When the claims of a patent essentially encompass a
relevant product market, the patent can create a significant barrier to entry and can
afford monopoly power to the patentee.
The relationship between patents and antitrust is complicated because when
patents do confer market power, patent monopolies can create the same
inefficiencies and anti-consumer effects as illegal monopolies. As Professor
Dreyfuss has noted, "Patented products are more expensive; quantity and quality
are less than they would be in a competitive market. Furthermore, there is
deadweight loss created as those who would buy the product at the competitive
price forgo purchase at the higher patent price." 8 However, antitrust law tolerates
these ill effects in the context of patented products because the patent system
encourages innovation by preventing free riding and providing short-term
exclusionary rights to inventors in exchange for their disclosure. In short, antitrust
law and patent law attempt to balance the goals of competition and innovation, and,
as a result, antitrust law tolerates monopolies secured through patents.
Unfortunately, many patents are invalid. 9 The patent system is currently ill-
equipped to prevent invalid patents from issuing and potentially distorting
competitive markets. While at the turn of the millennium, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) received approximately 1,000 patent applications every
business day, 10 it received over 400,000 per year by 2005. 11 Therefore, evaluating
the claims of each application imposes a substantial burden on the PTO. That
burden is not sufficiently eased by reliance on the patent applicant for information.
While the patent applicant must disclose known information relevant to
patentability, the PTO imposes no duty on the applicant to research the prior art.
1 2
Given their duty to report any negative information of which they are aware,
applicants may find it rational not to perform any research that might expose
7. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey,
Valuable Patents, 92 GEo. L.J. 435 (2004).
8. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 275 (2000).
9. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of
the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 420 (1994). Invalid is, of course,
different than fraudulently procured. Courts can invalidate a patent as improvidently issued
even though the patent applicant committed no fraud or any wrong conduct against the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office.
10. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ExEcuTIvE SUMMARY, 9-10 (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC INNOVATION REPORT].
11. Patent Quality Enhancement in the Information-Based Economy: Oversight Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Jon W. Dudas, Under Secretary of
Commerce for Intellectual Property), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/dudasO40506.pdf
12. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal
for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 314-15 (2001) ("Concerned that the failure to
disclose a known reference will lead to the unenforceability of the patent, some applicants
prefer to await the examiner's search results rather than consult the prior art themselves.").
[Vol. 83:133
PA TENTS OF DAMOCLES
material adverse information.' 3 Because patent applications are prosecuted ex
parte-and applications are generally confidential for the first eighteen months
after filing-third parties are typically not in a position to provide information that
would cause the examiner to correctly reject the application. 14 In addition to these
informational limitations, patent examiners generally have fewer than twenty-four
working hours "to read and understand the application, search for prior art, evaluate
patentability, communicate with the applicant, work out necessary revisions, and
reach and write up conclusions."1 5 This time crunch is particularly grueling in
complex areas of innovation such as biotechnology patents. 6 As the scope of
patentable subject matter expands, patent examiners sometimes do not possess
sufficient training to evaluate applications. '7 Yet, the burden of proof is on the
examiner to show that the patent should not issue.' 8 Furthermore, once a patent
issues, the patentee has no continuing obligation to inform the Patent Office of
information it later discovers that would have been material during the application
process.' 9 Thus, if a patentee subsequently learns that its patent should not have
issued, it has no duty to alert either the PTO or its competitors that its patent is, in
fact, invalid. Given the number of patents issued each year, their duration, the
number of patents found to be invalid, and the extreme difficulty of challenging
patent validity, 20 it is reasonable to conclude that hundreds-if not thousands-of
invalid patents exist in the American marketplace.
It is unclear how many of these invalid patents issue as a result of fraud or
misconduct. Patent applicants can commit fraud upon the Patent Office in myriad
ways. Applicants can commit fraud either by failing to disclose material
information or by submitting false information. For example, because a patent
13. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 669 n.127 (2002) (citation
omitted) ("According to Glenn S. Tenney, past chair of the Intellectual Property Committee
of the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers, patent attorneys advise their clients
only to reveal information they already know, and not to search for additional information,
lest it reveal material that adversely affects the patentability of the invention.").
14. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the
Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, 755 (1986) ("Patent applications are prosecuted
ex parte and, although the PTO keeps extensive files of prior art, the absence of an interested
party adverse to the patentee makes it improbable that every argument against patentability
will be considered in every case.").
15. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 10, ch. 5, at 5.
16. Id. at ch. 1, p. 34.
17. See id.
18. Id. at ch. 5, p. 8.
19. 6 DONALD S. CIsUM, CmSUM ON PATENTS § 19.0312][b][iv], at 19-20 (Matthew
Bender 2007) (1978) ("A patent owner need not disclose to the PTO information that comes
to its attention after a patent issues.").
20. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
21. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1342-43 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1070 (Fed. Cir.
1998) ("a fraudulent omission can be just as reprehensible as a fraudulent
misrepresentation."). In many instances, the applicant omits references to relevant prior art,
but other omissions can be important as well. For example, a patent may also be invalid
because the applicant failed to disclose the best mode for practicing the invention:
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cannot issue if the inventor made public use of the invention--or sold or offered it
for sale-more than one year before filing an application,22 a patent applicant may
misrepresent the date of the first public use or sale or offer for sale.23 Depending on
the type of fraud, potential competitors may have no way to determine whether the
patentee committed fraud in order to obtain its patent from the PTO.
Fraudulently procured patents upset the delicate balance between antitrust law's
prohibition of monopolization and patent law's encouragement of innovation
through the grant of exclusionary rights. For those fraudulently procured patents
that confer monopoly power, competition is injured without any countervailing
social benefit. Like valid patents, fraudulently procured patents represent serious
barriers to entry in some markets. 24 Fear of inviting an infringement suit will deter
many competitors from entering a market with a product that would infringe the
dominant firm's patent, even if the competitors suspect that that patent is invalid.
The cost of defending against any infringement suit runs into the millions, win or
lose. 25 And the difficulty of establishing invalidity is high because patents must be
proven invalid by clear and convincing evidence,2 6 and juries strongly favor
patentholders in validity challenges.
27
Fraudulently procured patents thus impose costs on competitors, who must
investigate the validity of the dominant firm's patent as well as determine whether
their product infringes that patent. New competitors wishing to avoid infringing the
patent may attempt to design around the patent in order to create a noninfringing
substitute.28 Others may engage in negotiations with the monopolist and pay
royalties for a license on the patent.29 All of these avenues delay market entry and
cost money; all of these costs increase the barriers to entry.
The patent statute requires that a patent specification "shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention." 35 U.S.C. §
112 (1994). Determining whether a patent fails to comply with the best mode
requirement and is thus invalid involves two factual inquiries. First, the fact-
finder must determine whether at the time an applicant filed an application for
patent, he or she had a best mode of practicing the invention, which is a
subjective determination. Second, if the inventor had a best mode of practicing
the invention, the fact-finder must determine whether the best mode was
disclosed in sufficient detail to allow a skilled artisan to practice it without
undue experimentation, which is an objective determination. See United States
Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1212 (Fed.Cir. 1996).
Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1064.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
23. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965).
24. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid
Patents, 91 MINN. L. REv. 101 (2006).
25. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW Ass'N, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SuRvEY 22 (2003).
26. E.g., Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1065 ("[T]he burden is on an accused infringer to
show by clear and convincing evidence facts supporting the conclusion that the patent is
invalid.").
27. See Leslie, supra note 24, at 135-36.
28. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 10, ch. 2, at 22 ("In still other contexts the
design-around may add little value, merely requiring that competitors 'work harder to get to
the same place."').
29. See infra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
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While the patent system aims to increase research and innovation, fraudulently
procured patents can have precisely the opposite effect. Fear of costly infringement
litigation can cause competitors to give too wide a berth to an invalid patent.
Following its extensive hearings on the patent system, the Federal Trade
Commission reported:
One firm's questionable patent may lead its competitor to forgo R&D in the
areas that the patent improperly covers. For example, firms in the biotech
industry reported that they avoid infringing questionable patents and therefore
will refrain from entering or continuing with a particular field of research that
such patents appear to cover. Such effects deter market entry and follow-on
innovation by competitors and increase the potential for the holder of a
questionable patent to suppress competition. 
30
Commentators, too, have noted that "[i]nvalid patents lack any semblance of
constitutional, statutory or policy justification. Contrary to the basic policy of the
patent law they obviously impede technical innovation and competition, as well as
increase prices.' In short, fraudulently procured patents can deter market entry as
effectively as valid patents.
When a patent applicant commits fraud against the Patent Office and
subsequently achieves monopoly power because of the fraudulently issued patent,
antitrust laws are implicated. In Walker Process, the Supreme Court held that when
a monopolist procures a patent through fraud on the PTO, excluded competitors can
bring suit under Section Two of the Sherman Act; specifically, the Court held "that
the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative
of § 2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are
present."' 32 The Ninth Circuit in Handgards33 later applied Walker Process's
reasoning to situations in which a monopolist does not commit fraud against the
PTO, but instead obtains an invalid patent from another party that the monopolist
knows committed fraud against the PTO to acquire the patent.
34
30. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 10, Executive Summary at 5-6.
31. Allan N. Littman, Restoring the Balance of Our Patent System, 37 IDEA 545, 556
(1997). In its amicus brief in support of the petitioner, Walker Process, the government took
note of "the public policy favoring the elimination of fraudulently obtained patents, which
otherwise would clog our system of free competition." Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14, Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1964) in 17 ANTrrRUST LAW: MAJOR BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED STATES 1955 TERM-1975 TERM at 730 (Philip B.
Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1979).
32. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174
(1965).
33. Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979).
34. Id. Justice Harlan, in his concurrence in Walker Process, foreshadowed this
development:
[A] treble-damage action for monopolization which, but for the existence of a
patent, would be violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act may be maintained ... if
two conditions are satisfied: (1) the relevant patent is shown to have been
procured by knowing and willful fraud practiced by the defendant on the Patent
Office or, if the defendant was not the original patent applicant, he had been
2008]
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An antitrust plaintiff charging a dominant firm with illegal monopolization
under either a Walker Process or Handgards theory of recovery would have to
prove all of the necessary elements of a Section Two claim, namely "(1) the
[defendant's] possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident." 35 This means that the excluded competitor must define the relevant
market and establish that the patentee had the ability to control price in that market.
Walker Process and Handgards essentially provide an excluded competitor a
means of satisfying the second prong of a monopolization case-that the
monopolist acquired its market power through anticompetitive conduct, not through
competition on the merits. But satisfying this prong by showing that the monopolist
acquired a patent through fraud is no easy task. Because patents are presumed
valid, the antitrust plaintiff must prove patent invalidity by clear and convincing
evidence.36 Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that the monopolist committed
fraud-or knew that the original patent applicant committed fraud-against the
Patent Office. Under either a Walker Process or a Handgards claim, the antitrust
plaintiff must also prove that the patent holder took steps to enforce the
fraudulently procured patent against that plaintiff. Finally, the plaintiff must prove
causation-namely that it was driven from the market because of the defendant's
fraudulently procured patent-and that it suffered antitrust injury as a result.37 This
Article addresses only the enforcement component of these antitrust claims.
Walker Process litigation would seem to be a great tool to deter monopolization
through fraudulent patents. But the promise has not matched the reality; there are
very few successful Walker Process lawsuits. Two possible explanations spring to
mind. One is that patent applicants are not committing fraud against the PTO in
order to secure illegal monopolies. The second explanation is that something is
wrong with the Walker Process legal test itself, which makes it an ineffective
weapon against fraudulently procured patents. Much anecdotal evidence
unfortunately suggests that the former explanation is not correct. 38 Instead, the
problem lies with the Walker Process test, and specifically with the enforcement
requirement.
II. THE PATENT ENFORCEMENT REQUIREMENT IN ANTITRUST LAW
Walker Process and Handgards form a cohesive body of antitrust law that
denounces the use of fraudulent patents to secure monopoly power. Walker Process
enforcing the patent with knowledge of the fraudulent manner in which it was
obtained; and (2) all elements otherwise necessary to establish a § 2
monopolization charge are proved.
Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 179 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). The plaintiff could
also pursue an attempted monopolization claim, which would require her to show "(1) that
the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent
to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power." Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
36. See Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
37. See Leslie, supra note 24, at 165-70.
38. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1984).
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condemns a monopolist's enforcement of a patent that it obtained by committing
fraud against the PTO, while Handgards bars a monopolist from enforcing a
patent-that it knows to have been fraudulently procured by the original
applicant-in order to secure a monopoly. While Walker Process and Handgards
claims differ in how the monopolist acquired its fraudulently procured patent, both
causes of action impose liability only if the patent holder actually enforces that
patent in order to acquire or maintain monopoly power in a relevant market.
Enforcement of the fraudulently procured patent has become the touchstone for
Walker Process liability. Lower courts declared that the "carefully chosen language
of the Supreme Court makes it perfectly clear that it is 'the enforcement of a patent
procured by fraud on the Patent Office' that is a necessary precondition to possible
Section 2 Sherman Act liability." 39 Federal courts now treat patent enforcement
efforts as the "sine qua non" of Walker Process cases.
40
Unfortunately, the Walker Process Court did not define what it meant by
"enforcement." In the context of that case, the patentee clearly enforced the
fraudulently procured patent because it sued its competitor for infringement, so the
Court had no occasion to define the precise contours of the conduct that constitutes
enforcement.
Lower courts, stepping into the gap left by the Court, have narrowly construed
what constitutes patent enforcement. Clearly, bringing an infringement lawsuit
constitutes patent enforcement, as the facts of Walker Process itself demonstrate.4'
In addition, an explicit threat to sue an infringing competitor can also represent
42
enforcement. The threats that satisfy the Walker Process enforcement
requirement are essentially defined by patent law, in that the Federal Circuit has
held that "as a matter of Federal Circuit antitrust law, the standards .. . for
determining jurisdiction in a Declaratory Judgment Action of patent invalidity also
define the minimum level of 'enforcement' necessary to expose the patentee to a
Walker Process claim." 43 Until quite recently, in order to have standing to pursue a
39. Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 334 F. Supp. 1329, 1332 (D.
Del. 1971) (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 1331; Cal. E. Labs., Inc. v. Gould, 896 F.2d 400,403 (9th Cir.1990) ("Without
some effort at enforcement, the patent cannot serve as the foundation of a monopolization
case.").
41. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175
(1965) ("Both Walker and the United States ... argue that if Food Machinery obtained its
patent by fraud and thereafter used the patent to exclude Walker from the market through
'threats of suit' and prosecution of this infringement suit, such proof would establish a prima
facie violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.").
42. Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1344, 1352-53 (N.D.N.Y.
1983).
43. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2004), rev'd on other grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006) (discussing attempted monopolization).
Other courts have also reasoned that the standard for showing "enforcement" sufficient to
survive a summary judgment motion in a Walker Process case is essentially equivalent to the
test for declaratory judgment standing in patent cases. See Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc. v.
Glaverbel S.A., 861 F. Supp. 653, 660 (N.D. 111. 1994); Indium Corp., 566 F. Supp. at 1353
("The [Walker Process enforcement] standard also parallels the case and controversy
requirement for declaratory judgment jurisdiction over patent suits, thereby obviating the
contradictory possibility that a complaint alleging patent invalidity might be sufficient under
20081
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
declaratory judgment seeking to expose a patent as invalid, a competitor had to
show that it is infringing (or has taken concrete steps with the intent of infringing)
the suspect patent and that the patentee has executed "an explicit threat or other
action . . . which creates a reasonable apprehension" that an infringement suit is
forthcoming.
44
Although the Supreme Court recently discarded the Federal Circuit's reasonable
apprehension test, the Federal Circuit has continued to make the same errors, albeit
under a different rubric. In order to show that that little has changed, Part III will
illustrate the problems under the reasonable apprehension test before discussing its
abandonment and subsequent reincarnation in a different guise. Part m will analyze
a combination of antitrust and declaratory judgment cases in order to explore how
artificially circumscribed this test is and how those monopolists who have
committed patent fraud can take refuge in this legal test to avoid the risk of being
held liable for illegal monopolization.
III. HARNESSING THE EXCLUSIONARY POWER OF FRAUDULENTLY PROCURED
PATENTS WITHOUT "ENFORCING" THEM
Companies flex their patent muscle in myriad ways beyond actually threatening
or initiating litigation. Under the Walker Process doctrine, antitrust law only
condemns patent fraud by a monopolist when the patent holder actively enforces
the patent through litigation or threats of litigation. However, a monopolist can
profit from its fraudulently procured patent even without taking such explicit
enforcement efforts. Allowing monopolization claims to proceed only when a
defendant has enforced its patent through actual or explicitly threatened litigation is
insufficient.
It is clear why filing infringement litigation represents patent enforcement.
Litigation is the quintessential method of enforcing patent rights. Why does
threatening infringement litigation constitute enforcement? No court or
commentator has ever addressed the question, but the answer seems
straightforward. A patentee threatens infringement litigation in order to keep a rival
out of the market altogether or to force the other firm to pay a licensing fee, which
necessarily imposes costs on the competitor. Either way, the threat of litigation
creates a barrier to entry. It invokes the exclusionary rights associated with the
patent to dissuade competitors from entering the market easily or cheaply.
But other forms of conduct that patentees engage in have these same
exclusionary effects: deterring (or delaying) market entry 45 and raising rivals'
costs of entry. This section reviews some of the other ways that a patentee can
threaten potential competitors without meeting the enforcement requirement for
antitrust claims based on monopolization through fraudulent patents. These
the antitrust laws, but not under the Declaratory Judgment Act.").
44. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 541 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
The Supreme Court's abandonment of the reasonable apprehension test is discussed below,
see infra notes 144-154 and accompanying text.
45. Any delay could be worth a significant amount of money to an antitrust violator.
Edwin A. Blackstone & Gary W. Bowman, Antitrust Damages: The Loss from Delay, 32
ANTITRUST BULL. 93, 95 (1987).
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include: publicly flaunting one's patent; stating a general intent to sue infringers;
accusing competitors of infringement; threatening competitors' business partners;
and licensing activities. If these forms of conduct achieve the same exclusionary
effects as infringement lawsuits and explicit litigation threats-which clearly
constitute patent enforcement-then these acts should similarly satisfy the
enforcement requirement of a Walker Process claim.
These less explicit forms of patent enforcement are often designed to make
competitors concerned that market entry can lead to substantial damages should the
patentee successfully sue for infringement. In addition to the fear of liability for
infringement-which can be crippling-litigation costs play an important role in
the exclusionary effect of a patentee's implicit threats to sue. Defending against an
infringement lawsuit generally costs a competitor millions of dollars. 46 Yet even if
it wins, the successful defendant in a patent infringement suit is not generally
entitled to attorney's fees except in exceptional cases.47 In some markets, such as
those involving software and business method patents, "the high costs of patent
litigation may discourage [competitors] from challenging a patent at all." 48 Several
factors may increase the exclusionary effects of litigation costs. For example, when
the new competitor is smaller than the patentee, litigation costs may be a
particularly important barrier to entry because
a large firm is a more efficient bearer of litigation costs than a small firm. An
infringement suit based on a fraudulent patent claim is costly for both plaintiff
and the defendant, but considered as a percentage of output or profits it is more
costly to the rival, whose output is much smaller.
49
Further, the alleged infringer's litigation costs are likely greater than those of the
patentee bringing an infringement suit.5 0 Also, when the competitor is not yet
entrenched in the market-either because it has not entered or has not ramped up
production-it may make more business sense to avoid that market altogether than
to engage in costly infringement litigation.5'
Even if market entry is not deterred completely, soft enforcement by a patentee
may limit the speed and size of entry. A prudent potential entrant must investigate
the patent to determine its validity and scope, which can take several months. New
competitors know that even if they attempt to enter the market and draw an
infringement suit, the litigation could delay their ultimate market entry for several
years, 52 especially if the patentee secures a preliminary injunction. Furthermore,
46. AM. INTELLECruAL PRop. LAW Ass'N, supra note 25, at 22.
47. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000) ("The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party.").
48. Thomas, supra note 12, at 320 (discussing software and business method patents).
49. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 153 (2005).
50. Plastic Container Corp. v. Cont'l Plastics of Okla., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 834, 856
(W.D. Okla. 1980) ("The defendant's costs in defending a patent infringement suit are
generally substantially greater than those of the plaintiff." (citation omitted)).
51. HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 153 ("But actual or threatened litigation is an
effective exclusion device when the rival has not yet begun to produce, or is producing at
such a low level that the costs and risks of litigation overwhelm it.").
52. See Thomas, supra note 12, at 320 ("However, competitors of the patentee may face
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because each sale of an infringing product increases the damages an infringer owes
if the patentee successfully sues, the fear of litigation means that, in at least some
cases, "infringers' entry will be limited ... because the marginal benefit of entry is
weighed against pro-rata damages." 53 This means that public threats can reduce
competition, making these threats essentially an exercise of patent rights.
Two important caveats to the following discussion are in order. First, none of
these acts alone constitutes anticompetitive conduct sufficient to satisfy the
anticompetitive element of an illegal monopolization claim. No antitrust liability
exists unless the patentee engaging in this conduct also possesses monopoly power
in a relevant market, has procured the patent it is enforcing by committing fraud on
the Patent Office, and is using that patent to maintain an illegal monopoly. Even
then, no damages could be awarded unless the plaintiff could further prove that it
suffered an antitrust injury and that the defendant's enforcement conduct caused
that injury. Second, these acts are not necessarily patent enforcement sufficient to
satisfy the Walker Process requirement. Rather, as Part IV argues, whether an
activity constitutes enforcement is contextual. Part III merely examines and
condemns judicial opinions that hold that certain acts by patentees can never
constitute enforcement, and argues that some of these acts may, in certain
circumstances, represent enforcement sufficient to satisfy the enforcement element
of a Walker Process or Handgards claim.
A. Publicly Flaunting a Patent
Firms publicly announce that they own patents in a variety of ways. First, firms
often mark their products as either patented or as being subject to a pending patent
application. It is common for companies to note on their packaging that a product is
protected by one or more patents. Second, many print ads and television
commercials note that a product has received patent protection. In many cases, a
firm may advertise its patent to convince gullible consumers that a patent
represents the government's endorsement or imprimatur that the advertised product
is actually effective. 54 But such ads necessarily inform competitors that a patent has
issued and that the manufacture or sale of an infringing product could invite
litigation. Third, in addition to noting one's patent in advertisements or on the
product itself, firms may also tout their patents in public announcements or private
correspondence. Patentees sometimes write letters to competitors informing them
that a particular patent has survived reexamination. 55 All of these actions can put
competitors on notice that a dominant firm possesses a relevant patent.
Courts are generally unsympathetic to the possible exclusionary effects of
patentees announcing their patents to competitors. Judges have held that "widely
delays of several years as they seek to strike down such [software and business method]
patents.").
53. Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing
Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies,
97 MiCH. L. REv. 985, 993 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
54. See Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A
Proposal for a New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1, 3 (2000).
55. See, e.g., Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. Alza Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1160 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
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publiciz[ing] the existence" of a patent "to the industry in general" is not
enforcement sufficient to allow a Walker Process claim to proceed.56 Neither does
sending a letter stating that one's patent is valid, having survived reexamination,
constitute enforcement for these purposes. 57 Subjectively threatening letters can be
written so as to appear nonthreatening to a federal judge.5 8 Also, an apparent
double standard can be seen in the fact that a patentee's nonenforceable assurances
that it is not going to sue for infringement denies standing to a would-be competitor
that pursues a patent-invalidating declaratory judgment action, and thus is not
enforcement for antitrust purposes. 59 However, neither a refusal to covenant not to
sue 6° nor a patentee's refusal to release claims creates a reasonable apprehension of
suit.
6 1
Publicly announcing one's patent can represent a form of patent enforcement
when touting a patent deters competitors from entering the market. The decision to
secure patent protection generally evinces a desire to acquire and exercise
exclusionary rights. The intent to enforce is generally implied in the patent grant.
The reason that most inventors secure patent protection is to acquire the bundle of
exclusionary rights. 62 If the inventor had no desire to erect barriers to entry, she
56. Hydril Co. v. Grant Prideco, 385 F. Supp. 2d 609, 611 (S.D. Tex. 2005), rev'd on
other grounds, 474 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc. v.
Glaverbel S.A., 861 F. Supp. 653, 661 (N.D. Il. 1994) ("But whatever that hypothetical
lesser quantum of conduct might be [to constitute patent enforcement for a Walker Process
claim], it surely would have to be more than the Delphic reference to the existence of a
patent or patents that Northlake offers here. If it were otherwise, any such reference-
however innocuous-could trigger exposure to an antitrust claim. Any such rule would be
absurd, for common sense teaches that some more assertive conduct is required before a
patent holder can be said, within the meaning of the antitrust laws, to be enforcing its
patent." (emphasis omitted)).
57. See, e.g., Cygnus Therapeutics, 92 F.3d at 1160.
58. See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1495, 1516 (2001) ("[C]ompetitors or potential competitors may have received a letter
alerting them to the existence of the patent, though that letter will likely have been couched
in extremely bland terms, purporting merely to make the competitor aware of the patent in
case it should want to take a license.").
59. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Genrad, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1995);
see also Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1059 (Fed. Cir.
1995); Evans Med. Ltd. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 980 F. Supp. 132, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
("Such agreement need not be unconditional nor covenanted to divest the jurisdiction of the
court."). Fortunately, the Federal Circuit has recently held that a patentee's assurances of
nonenforcement can be outweighed by the patentee's other acts that do indicate an intent to
enforce. Sandisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir.
2007) ("[A patentee's] direct and unequivocal statement that '[it had] absolutely no plan
whatsoever to sue [the declaratory judgment plaintiff]' . . . [does not] eliminate[] the
justiciable controversy created by [its] actions, because [the patentee] has engaged in a
course of conduct that shows a preparedness and willingness to enforce its patent rights
despite [that] statement.").
60. See K-Lath v. Davis Wire Corp., 15 F. Supp. 2d 952, 962 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Ryobi
Am. Corp. v. Peters, 815 F. Supp. 172, 174 (D.S.C. 1993).
61. See Dataline, Inc. v. MCI Worldcom Network Servs., No. 00 CIV. 1578 LAP., 2001
WL 102336, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2001).
62. Firms can also acquire patents for reasons unrelated to enforcement against actual
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could simply disclose her invention without applying for a patent (or, if she were
worried that another inventor could patent the product or process, she could patent
her invention and dedicate her patent to the public domain). A firm generally would
not communicate that it owns a patent unless it was trying to communicate a belief
in the patent's validity and the intent to enforce the patent.
Public announcements are also threatening to competitors because they can
increase the patent's punch at litigation. If a competitor makes an infringing
product and it knew about the patentee's patent, then the infringing competitor can
be held liable for willful infringement. 63 A firm found to have committed willful
infringement can be liable for treble damages. 64 That risk alone is sufficient to
deter many would-be competitors, especially small upstarts, from entering a
market. In order to try to avoid an eventual finding of willful infringement, the
prudent competitor-who is afraid of potentially infringing-will need to secure an
opinion letter from an attorney, which imposes an additional set of costs.
A dominant firm's announcement of its patent will often impose costs on actual
and prospective competitors who feel compelled to investigate the scope and
validity of the touted patent. In many cases, a patent is invalid for a reason that
potential competitors do not know but could possibly find out. 65 The issue is "at
and potential infringers. First, some firms "engage in 'defensive patenting,' obtaining patents
to stake their claim to an area of technology in hopes of preventing other companies from
suing them. Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that at least among high-technology and
start-up companies, the primary purpose of patents is defensive." Lemley, supra note 58, at
1504; Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 137, 143 (2000) ("One of the major reasons that companies get patents is
that they're afraid that their competitors have them, and they don't want to be the only one
left who doesn't have the ability to play in this game."). Second, the mere possession of even
unenforced patents can communicate relevant information to capital markets and labor
markets. Professor Clarisa Long shows how "patents can serve as a signal of firm quality. By
acting as a signal, possession of intellectual property may reduce the cost of communicating
private information to the market regarding the financial prospects of the firm." Long, supra
note 13, at 637; see Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA.
L. REv. 1 (2005). Merely possessing patents may inform capital markets, investors, and
consumers that a firm is innovative. See Long, supra note 13, at 651. This signaling function
occurs independently of patent enforcement. Third, "[e]stablished companies may patent out
of inertia, to maintain a reputation as a market leader, or simply for the marquee value of
selling a product with 'patented technology."' Lemley, supra note 58, at 1506.
63. See Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1369-70 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1357 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
2005) ("Failure to take on the costs of a reasonably competent search for information
necessary to interpret each patent, investigation into prior art and other information bearing
on the quality of the patents, and analysis thereof can result in a finding of willful
infringement, which may treble the damages an infringer would otherwise have to pay.");
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342-43
(Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Determination of willfulness is made on consideration of the totality of
the circumstances .... ").
64. See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342 ("'[T]he court may increase damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed."' (citing 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000))).
65. See In re Portola, 110 F.3d 786, 789 (Fed. Cir. 1997) Discussing the policy
justifications for a reexamination proceeding, the court cited the congressional testimony of
Donald R. Dunner, the president of the American Patent Law Association, who stated, "[l]t
is inevitable ... that all of the prior art will not be uncovered [by the PTO]. A determined
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what cost?" Search costs can be high. 66 For small start-up companies, even
seemingly small additional costs could delay or prevent entry to the market. When
that dominant firm announces its patent knowing it was fraudulently procured, the
firm is creating an inefficient barrier to entry. Making potential new entrants
investigate whether the patent was fraudulently procured is clearly anticompetitive
conduct that will increase the entry costs of competitors or reduce the likelihood of
quick entry into the marketplace. Antitrust law generally views raising rivals' costs
as exclusionary conduct, even if it does not deter market entry altogether, because it
can delay entry and render competitors less aggressive price cutters, as they must
recoup the unnecessary costs imposed by the dominant firm's predatory conduct.
Given that raising rivals' costs can satisfy the anticompetitive conduct element of a
Section Two claim in cases not involving patent-holding monopolists, it would be
anomalous if it did not constitute patent enforcement in Walker Process litigation.
In addition to general announcement of a patent's existence, marking a product
as patented should, in some circumstances, constitute patent enforcement for
antitrust purposes. Patentees may mark their products as patented to serve at least
two interrelated goals. On the one hand, patentees need to mark their products as
patented in order to increase the potential damages that they can recover in the
event of infringement. 67 As such, marking is option-preserving. But marking also
holds out the patent as the legitimate property of the patentee, and also indicates an
intent to enforce. Because the primary reason to mark a product as patented is to
ensure the availability of a damage award in an enforcement action against an
infringer, the marking primarily makes sense in conjunction with a threat to
enforce. By analogy, a sign that says "No Trespassing" is clearly designed to
threaten those who do not heed the warning. The sign is designed to deter
trespassing in the same way that patent-marking is designed to deter market entry.
Both attempt to enforce a property right.68
In some ways, the holder of a fraudulently procured patent can achieve more
cost-effective market exclusion by just brandishing the patent and not undertaking
advocate, desiring to do in a patent, spending tens of thousands of dollars in litigation
situations, can often, if not always, find something that has not been considered by the
[PrO]." Id. (citation omitted).
66. See Thomas, supra note 12, at 345.
67. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000) ("In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall
be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the
infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which
event damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice.").
Professor Lisa Dolak argues that it is wrong to allow marking to constitute notice but not to
trigger standing to pursue a declaratory judgment:
Any inconsistency between the standards for notice of infringement and
declaratory judgment jurisdiction is also contrary to the policies underlying the
patents clause of the Constitution and the patent statute, in that a potentially
invalid patent may be used to deter the accused infringer from pursuing
activities that are potentially beneficial to society. At the same time, the
accused infringer is powerless to litigate and resolve the merits of the patent.
Lisa A. Dolak, Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Patent Cases: Restoring the Balance
Between the Patentee and the Accused Infringer, 38 B.C. L. REv. 903, 946 (1997).
68. Furthermore, it is conduct that serves absolutely no other legitimate purpose.
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the costs of actual litigation. 69 Marking products as patented and making public
announcements entail a mere nominal cost but they can pack a significant deterrent
punch. For example, if the potential market entrant is unaware that a relevant patent
was fraudulently procured, it will not compete even though the dominant firm has
no valid right to exclude new entrants. It is not just actual infringement suits that
deter entry into markets; it is the fear of such lawsuits.7 ° Potential competitors can
be deterred by the risk of infringement litigation even if the patent holder does not
explicitly threaten likely entrants whose products would infringe the relevant patent
if it were valid. The primary reason to inform competitors of one's patent is to
create a fear of litigation, which the patentee hopes will either cause the target to
license the patent for a royalty payment or keep the target's competing, but
allegedly infringing, products out of the market altogether.71 Courts should
recognize that such efforts to create fear by brandishing a patent can constitute a
form of patent enforcement.
In sum, there are many ways to flaunt a patent short of explicitly threatening or
initiating litigation against a specific infringer, and this conduct can chill
competitive activity in the same ways as explicit threats or lawsuits. Therefore, it
may satisfy the threshold enforcement element of a Walker Process-type cause of
action. 72
B. Publicly Stating Intent to Enforce
Patentees express their plans to punish infringers by creating reputations for
aggressively defending their patent rights. Patentees sometimes explicitly threaten
to sue-or actually commence litigation against-one alleged infringer in order, in
part, to deter other potential infringers from entering the market.73 Aggressive
patentees tout their previous victories in patent infringement litigation to scare
away competitors.74 If a dominant firm with patents can earn a reputation for
responding belligerently to new rivals, then it does not have to threaten each
individual potential infringer in order to deter them from entering the market, lest
the new entrant draw a lawsuit.
However, absent an explicit threat of infringement litigation against a particular
infringer, courts have held that that infringer has no standing to challenge patent
69. See Joseph Borkin, The Patent Infringement Suit-Ordeal by Trial, 17 U. Cm. L.
REV. 634, 644 (1950) ("An arrow in the quiver is more valuable than one expended on a
missed target.").
70. Leslie, supra note 24, at 114-19.
71. While there may be nonexclusionary reasons to inform venture capitalists of one's
patents, see supra note 62, the reason that a firm informs its competitors of its patents is to
warn infringers about the prospect of litigation.
72. See supra Part II.
73. See, e.g., Agron, Inc. v. Lin, No. CV0305872MMM(JWJX), 2004 WL 555377 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 16, 2004).
74. See, e.g., Boums, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 331 F.3d 704, 714 (9th Cir. 2003)
(Pregerson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Raychem informed Bourns that it
could never enter the market without a patent license and that it had successfully enforced
the patents in question against another competitor, Therm-O-Disc.").
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validity.75 For example, courts have denied declaratory judgment standing to firms
when the patentee affirmatively tells another party in license negotiations that the
patentee intends to enforce its patent.76 Courts typically give little weight to the fact
that some patentees affirmatively perfect their general reputations for aggressively
enforcing their patent rights. Thus, one court held that a patentee's previous filing
of thirty-eight lawsuits against other alleged infringers of its other patents did not
create a reasonable apprehension of suit in an infringing competitor who had not
been directly and personally threatened by the patentee.77 This ignores the reality
that such a patentee does not have to issue direct, targeted threats: all would-be
competitors now know that market entry will very likely be met with costly
litigation. Knowing this, rational firms will not enter the market.
Courts consistently downplay the threatening nature of public commitments to
sue infringers.78 In Cygnus Therapeutics, at a public conference the patentee's
CEO responded to a question from an audience member about companies who the
CEO had asserted were "developing products that are covered by our patents. 79
He stated that those competitors
won't market the products because we're not going to give them licenses and
the patents are valid. In many cases, they've already been challenged and have
been upheld. And our policy will be that we have spent a great deal of money
developing this technology and we have a very strong proprietary position.
80
The Federal Circuit held that this statement did not "give rise to a reasonable
apprehension of suit" on the part of the companies developing the allegedly
infringing products. 81 The court seemed to think it important that the statement
"was made in response to a question from the audience." 82 But why is that
important? It was still a threat to enforce the patents. While the statement was not
directed to a particular infringer, it communicated an intent to enforce patents
against those competitors making allegedly infringing products. The competitors
who were the target of the threat could take no solace from the fact that it was made
in response to an audience member's question. Potential infringers had clearly been
warned that market entry would almost certainly guarantee litigation.
Some judges have also ratcheted up the requirement so that infringers must
show that the patentee's suit is imminent. For example, "the Federal Circuit has
focused on whether the patentee's conduct evidences an intent to institute an
infringement action imminently., 83 Similarly, when sitting as a district court judge
75. Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(quoting B.P. Chems., Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
76. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 888-89 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
77. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc. v. Pfizer Pharms., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 1281, 1283-84
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
78. See, e.g., Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., No. 96-2274-JWL, 1996
WL 568817 (D. Kan. Sept. 6, 1996) (denying standing for declaratory judgment).
79. Cygnus Therapeutics, 92 F.3d at 1156.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1159.
82. Id. at 1160.
83. Dolak, supra note 67, at 908 (emphasis in original).
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by designation in a patent suit in 2003, Judge Posner asserted that in the context of
patent challenges, the "declaratory-judgment procedure permits a prospective
defendant in effect to precipitate the plaintiff's suit... provided the plaintiffs suit
is imminent." 84 However, Judge Posner later seemed to up the standard even more
to "a serious, palpable, foreseeable, imminent threat of being sued . 8.5.. The
addition of these criteria is made without support of any citation to authority or any
analysis. Under either the Federal Circuit's or Judge Posner's approach, the
imminent threat standard is deeply flawed because the rational firm will not enter
the market in a manner that apparently infringes a patent if the firm believes that it
will be sued in two years. Those two years of business would simply run up the
successful patentee's damages at trial should the patentee prevail in litigation. A
threat to sue in the distant future can deter market entry now.
Public announcements by a patentee about its general intent to sue infringers
should be sufficient to satisfy Walker Process's enforcement requirement when
such statements are designed to make would-be competitors exit the market or not
enter in the first place. If such warnings successfully deter competitors, then the
patentholder has effectively exercised the exclusionary rights of its patent. That is
enforcement for the purposes of illegal monopolization. The fact that the patentee
did not have to actually sue shows the credibility of its implicit threat.
The fact that a public threat to enforce a patent may not promise imminent
litigation does not substantially diminish its exclusionary effect on competitors.
The power of the sword of Damocles was the possibility that it might fall. It
instilled fear in the diner not because of the eventuality of its falling---or even the
likelihood-but the mere ever-present possibility. So it can be with patents. Most
patentees do not have to initiate infringement litigation to gain the exclusionary
value of their patents. In some industries, the mere presence of the patent is
sufficient to ward off competitors. For example, in the Walker Process case itself,
buzz throughout the industry indicated that the monopolist's patent was invalid, yet
no one entered the market for years even though the monopolist was charging
customers three times the competitive price. 86 The fear of drawing the infringement
suit and the potential liability was sufficient to deter market entry despite the
rumors of invalidity and the prospect of significant returns on investment.
Additionally, actual infringement litigation against one competitor should be
sufficient to satisfy the Walker Process enforcement requirement in illegal
monopolization claims brought by other infringing competitors. Any patent
enforcement efforts "can have a chilling effect on new entry. As Irwin Steltzer
observed, a hunter who walks past a field with a no trespassing sign may ignore it,
unless the field is littered with bodies of previous trespassers.""s Some
patentholders try to hone and advertise their reputations for aggressively enforcing
their patent rights. 88 For example, in one case, the patentee warned a competitor
84. Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 990 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(Posner, J.) (citations omitted).
85. Id.
86. See Leslie, supra note 24, at 119, 123.
87. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Predatory Practices & Monopolization in the Airline
Industry: A Case Study of Minneapolis/St. Paul, 29 TRANSP. L.J. 129, 185 (2002).
88. Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anticompetitive Intellectual
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 518 n.59 (2003) ('The reputation for being tough
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that it "should never think about" manufacturing a particular product and it
ominously referenced an infringement suit it had brought eight years earlier against
another competitor.89 This, according to the court, did not constitute a sufficient
threat to afford the alleged infringers standing to challenge patent validity. 9° Yet,
this is clearly a statement of intent by the patentee to sue infringers; the statement is
designed to deter market entry. The patent is being leveraged against rivals: that's
enforcement.
Even previous infringement lawsuits that end in settlements reinforce the
patentee's willingness to aggressively assert its patent rights. And the settlements
often include an agreement between the parties that the patent is valid,91 providing
yet another warning to those competitors who would consider entering the market
with a potentially infringing product. In short, firms with a reputation for
aggressive patent enforcement need not file suit against a particular competitor in
order to deter market entry through the threat of litigation. Unfortunately, courts
often do not recognize such warnings as enforcement. 92 But the previous suits are,
by definition, enforcement and should be sufficient to trigger Walker Process
liability if the patentee is a monopolist who knows that her patent was fraudulently
procured.
C. Insinuations of Infringement
Short of explicitly threatening infringement litigation, some patentees accuse
their competitors of manufacturing or selling an infringing product. Other patentees
actively investigate their competitors' products, all the while letting their
competitors know that the sword of Damocles above them is being sharpened.
While some jurists have assumed in dicta that an infringement notice constitutes
enforcement, 93 courts have used either of two flawed arguments in order to
consistently deny competitors who receive such notifications standing to pursue
both declaratory judgments and antitrust actions. First, the Federal Circuit has
inappropriately defined what it means to accuse a competitor of infringement. For
example, the court has held that a patentee's assertions to another firm that its
makes the frivolous claim more credible and more valuable."); see also Patrick Bolton,
Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal
Policy, 88 GEo. L.J. 2239, 2300-01 (2000) (discussing suing others to create a reputation for
aggressively going after competitors).
89. Bourns, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 331 F.3d 704, 714 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pregerson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In May 1994, Raychem informed Boums that it
'should never think about' manufacturing PPTCs and reminded Boums of its 1986 suit
against Therm 0 Disc [sic].").
90. Id. at 714-15.
91. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir.
2003).
92. See, e.g., Bourns, 331 F.3d at 712 ('The threats that Boums showed were made by
Raychem to enforce its patents were made in May 1994 and September 1994. They were
threats to a bystander who was pawing the ground: don't get into our turf. They were not
threats to a competitor or to a business prepared to be a competitor.").
93. See, e.g., Miller Pipeline Corp. v. British Gas PLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138-39
(S.D. Ind. 1999) ("[T]he patentholder's competitors who receive infringement notices ...
have available to them the vehicle of a declaratory judgment action .... ").
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product is "covered by" the patents do not represent an infringement accusation
sufficient to create standing to challenge the patent's validity. 94 In particular, in the
context of licensing negotiations between a patentee and an alleged infringer, the
Federal Circuit has famously held that accusations by the patentee that its
competitor's "activities 'fall within,' are 'covered by,' and are 'operations under'
[the patentee's] patent fall short of alleging infringement." 95 This reading is
wooden. A firm has no need to take a license if its product does not potentially
infringe another firm's valid patent. For the patentee to say that its rival had better
purchase a license because the rival's product is "covered by" the patent can only
be an allegation of infringement. There is no other possible reason for the patentee
to use this language in a licensing negotiation.
Second, courts assume the patent is valid and then proceed to deny standing to
challenge the patent's validity. For example, one court affirmed a dismissal of a
Walker Process claim because "patents would be of little value if infringers of them
could not be notified of the consequences of infringement or proceeded against in
the courts." 96 This completely misses the point. Of course, holders of valid patents
can notify or sue infringers. But such actions represent forms of enforcement. The
relevant question in an illegal monopolization claim is whether or not the
patentholder's conduct at issue is enforcement, not whether such enforcement by
the holder of a valid patent is wrongful. Patentees have a right to sue infringers, but
that does not mean that bringing a lawsuit is not enforcement.
Furthermore, courts have held that a patentee does not create a reasonable
apprehension that it will initiate litigation by asking a competitor for product
samples to check for infringement.97 This approach seems mistaken because the
patentee's inquiry communicates critical information to the competitor. Asking
competitors for samples to check for infringement demonstrates that the
patentholder is actively monitoring the market in order to detect infringement, and
is an implicit statement that the patent will be enforced if infringement is found.
Otherwise, there is no reason for the patentholder to check for infringement. The
infringement investigation only makes sense if the patentee intends to demand
royalties or sue the competitor for possible infringement if the patentee determines
that the product comes within the patent's claims. Knowing that it is being
investigated for infringement will ordinarily chill the competitive zeal of a new
market entrant. Many firms would not continue to sell products-potentially
racking up damages-while the patentee is openly investigating them for
infringement. 98 If this investigative activity does reduce market entry, then the
patentee's conduct has harnessed the patent's exclusionary power-that's
enforcement.
94. Phillips Plastics Corp. v. Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051, 1052 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
95. Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 889 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
96. Oetiker v. Jurid Werke GMBH, 671 F.2d 596, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting Virtue
v. Creamery Package Mfg., 227 U.S. 8, 37-38 (1912)).
97. See, e.g., Am. Needle & Novelty Co. v. Schuessler Knitting Mills, Inc., 379 F.2d
376, 378 (7th Cir. 1967).
98. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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D. Statements to Business Partners
No business can survive without suppliers, distributors, and financing.
Dominant firms realize that if they can deny a new competitor access to any or all
of these necessities, they can deter new market entry or squash it when it does
occur. If a firm holds a patent, it may threaten these other players with infringement
litigation or attempt to convince them that doing business with the new competitor
(whose product allegedly infringes the dominant firm's patent) is not worth the
risk. And, indeed, the case law is rife with examples of monopolists with
fraudulently procured patents threatening competitors' business partners with
infringement litigation. 99
Courts have generally failed to appreciate that patentees often enforce their
patents not by threatening to sue their competitors directly, but by intimidating their
competitors' business partners.'1 ° For example, courts have made it safe for
patentees to threaten a competitor's suppliers as long as the patentee is in licensing
negotiations with the allegedly infringing competitor.' 0' In one case, even though
the patentee sent an explicit cease and desist letter to the alleged infringer's
suppliers, the court reasoned that there can be no reasonable apprehension of suit so
long as the patentee and its competitor are in licensing negotiations. 12 This
overlooks the effect of the threat on the supplier and the potential to destroy the
business relationship between the new competitor and its necessary supplier.
When the patentee makes accusations of infringement or implicit threats of
litigation to its competitor's business partners or both, these threats and accusations
should constitute patent enforcement sufficient for the competitor to bring Walker
Process litigation. Such communications harness the patent's exclusionary power.
Letters to suppliers or distributors sometimes cause competitors to lose business as
other firms refuse to work with them because of the implicit threat of infringement
litigation against the suppliers and distributors. 103 Financiers may be less willing to
99. See generally, e.g., Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984);
Arcade, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., No. CIV-1-88-141, 1991 WL 185155 (E.D. Tenn.
July 2, 1991).
100. One notable recent change involves the treatment of threats against customers. Until
recently, courts had held that informing the alleged infringer's customers that the products
infringe a patent-and thus could make the customers liable for infringement-did not
constitute a threat of enforcement. Bourns, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 331 F.3d 704, 714 (9th
Cir. 2003) (Pregerson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Finally, Raychem
informed its customers that Bourns' potential PPTC products would be in violation of its
patents."); see also Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Futech Educ. Prods., Inc., No. 97 C 0236, 1997 WL
627641 (N.D. 111. Oct. 1, 1997) (involving a patentee threatening a customer, though threats
to at least one customer were made by a fifty percent owner of the joint venture that had
exclusive rights over the patent and not by the joint venture itself). However, the Federal
Circuit just held that "a valid Walker Process claim may be based upon enforcement activity
directed against the plaintiff's customers." Hydril Co. v. Grant Prideco, 474 F.3d 1344, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2007); see also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d
514, 544-45 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
101. See, e.g., Livorsi Marine, Inc. v. Nordskog Publ'g, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 994 (N.D.
Ill. 2003).
102. Id. at 999.
103. See, e.g., Gardiner v. Gendel, 727 F. Supp. 799, 805 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ('The Court
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fund a new business whose product allegedly infringes a dominant firm's patent.
One commentator noted:
Consider the plight of the person who wishes to begin manufacturing widgets,
which are protected by a dubious patent. He needs to borrow five million
dollars for a widget factory but he cannot until he knows whether the patent is
valid. Nevertheless, he probably lacks standing to bring a declaratory judgment
action. He has not yet manufactured widgets nor has he been threatened with
infringement proceedings. 1
04
Threatened with potential infringement litigation by the patentee, some business
partners may demand indemnification from the new competitor whose product
allegedly infringes the patent. 105 Indemnification drives up the competitor's costs,
which makes it a less aggressive price competitor and more likely to exit the
market. All of these effects-deterring business partners, chasing away financing,
and raising rivals' costs-are essentially methods of enforcing the patent.
The current state of the law creates a perfect storm against competitors facing
monopolists with fraudulently procured patents. The monopolist can leverage the
full exclusionary effect of the patent by making vague threats or insinuations of
possible infringement litigation to their competitors' business partners while still
shielding their patent from declaratory judgment validity challenges and antitrust
claims. The ability to fire lethal shots from such a secure fortress could embolden
firms with fraudulently procured patents to exercise market power illegitimately.
E. Licensing or Refusing to License
Licensing is a critical component of a patent-infused marketplace. Inventors
often do not have the factories, labor force, or other necessary inputs to actually
manufacture patented products. In such markets, licensing helps get products to
market. For many inventors, the primary value from patents comes in the form of
licensing fees. Patentholders often license their patents to their competitors,
receiving royalties in exchange for promising not to sue for infringement.
Competitors sometimes pay to license a patent that they suspect was
fraudulently procured because risk of infringing and being held liable is too
great. 106 While some scholars suggest that a competitor need not pay a royalty to
concludes that plaintiffs have engaged in unfair competition based upon the false and
misleading threats of patent infringement sent to defendants' customers prior to the time that
plaintiffs had acquired any enforceable rights. The false cease and desist letters were
knowingly sent in bad faith with the intent to injure defendants' business, and resulted in the
loss of at least one of the defendants' distributors, who testified at trial that he dropped
defendants' product as a direct result of receipt of plaintiffs' letter.").
104. Gregory Gelfand, Expanding the Role of the Patent Office in Determining Patent
Validity: A Proposal, 65 CoRNELL L. REV. 75, 104 (1979).
105. See Agron, Inc. v. Lin, No. CV0305872MMM(JWJX), 2004 WL 555377, at *3
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2004) ("[T]hreats of litigation that have been made have purportedly
resulted in requests for defense and indemnification .... ).
106. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 768 (2007) ("If
respondents were to prevail in a patent infringement action, petitioner could be ordered to
pay treble damages and attorney's fees, and could be enjoined from selling Synagis, a
product that has accounted for more than 80 percent of its revenue from sales since 1999.
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make and sell a product that infringes upon a patent of suspect validity, 0 7 it is
often rational for the competitor to license a patent that she does not believe is
valid. If the licensee enters the market without a license and cannot prove
invalidity, the patent litigation could bankrupt the firm. The cost of a license can be
considerably less than the damages for infringement discounted by the probability
of being held liable. Even if it were assured victory at trial, the rational, risk-averse
competitor would pay a modest licensing fee for a suspect patent as the cost of
avoiding litigation.108 The FTC has noted that in the computer hardware and
semiconductor industries, patentees "seeking to hold up rivals can set the licensing
fees below the cost of litigation, including the managerial distraction, so as to make
the taking of a license the only economically sensible alternative, regardless of the
strength of the patent."' 9 As a result, "by seeking royalties below the cost of
challenging a patent's validity, [patentees] can obtain royalties on improperly
granted patents." 11 0
Licensing activity does not currently qualify as enforcement for Walker Process
purposes."' Courts have held that a patentee's "cautioning possible infringers and
offering licenses, does not constitute a charge of infringement."" 2 Even if the
patentee explicitly threatens infringement litigation during licensing negotiations,
courts find no enforcement. For example, federal courts considering Walker
Process claims have found statements by a patentee that it "would be forced to
vindicate its patent rights if no settlement proposal were received" from the alleged
infringer to be insufficient to meet the enforcement threshold of an illegal
monopolization claim. " 3 The Federal Circuit has held that even explicit threats to
Unwilling to risk such serious consequences, petitioner paid the demanded royalties 'under
protest and with reservation of all of [its] rights."').
107. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 717 ("Finally, if the licensee thought the patent
invalid, it could refuse to enter any agreement that required royalty payments after lapse;
refuse to agree not to challenge the patent itself; refuse to license the patent and instead bring
an action to have it declared invalid; initiate the patent's reexamination by the PTO; or
simply begin to infringe." (citations omitted)). See supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text
(discussing why patent system does not solve problem of invalid patents).
108. See Lemley, supra note 58, at 1507 ("The cost of licensing without going to court is
also dramatically lower than the cost of litigation."); Thomas, supra note 12, at 335 ('This
analysis may strike some readers as both speculative and rather cynical. Still, patentees from
George Selden to Jerome Lemelson have long recognized that prospective licensees often
prefer to pay a modest royalty rather than contest an invalid patent.").
109. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 10, ch. 3, at 40.
110. Id., ch. 3, at 41 . While a competitor may be willing to pay a license fee for a patent,
it is not reasonable for the patentee to accept that money if she knows that her patent is not
valid. The rationality of the licensee's decision to pay royalties does not excuse the
patentee's misdeed.
111. The Supreme Court's recent decision in MedImmune could ultimately alter the law.
In MedImmune, the Court held that a licensee in good standing was not necessarily
precluded from challenging the validity of the patent for which it had a license. 127 S. Ct. at
777. While that holding is a step in the right direction, it is a far cry from granting Walker
Process standing to competitors who are paying royalties on a patent that they believe to
have been procured by fraud.
112. Am. Needle & Novelty Co. v. Schuessler Knitting Mills, Inc., 379 F.2d 376, 378
(7th Cir. 1967).
113. Oetiker v. Jurid Werke GMBH, 671 F.2d 596, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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sue for patent infringement do not constitute enforcement of the patent if the threats
are made in the context of licensing negotiations. 1
1 4
When a patentholder negotiates and accepts a licensing fee for a patent, that
should constitute enforcement of the patent sufficient to satisfy the enforcement
requirement announced in Walker Process. This is so for several related reasons.
First, licensing activity often signals an intent to enforce the patent rights through
litigation."15 The Federal Circuit has recognized that in licensing negotiations,
"[t]he threat of enforcement . . . is the entire source of the patentee's bargaining
power.""16 Indeed, the threat of infringement litigation is inherent in licensing
negotiations.
Second, licensing should constitute enforcement for Walker Process purposes
because it imposes costs on competitors that they would not incur in a competitive
market unhindered by fraudulently procured patents. For example, a competitor
must pay the negotiated licensing fee. Courts have recognized that "unless the
license is royalty-free, the royalty itself is a barrier to entry, anathema to unfettered
competition."" 17 This raises rivals' costs and secures the monopolist additional ill-
gotten profits. Independently of the license fee itself and regardless of the outcome
of the licensing discussions, even engaging in the process of negotiating for a
license costs competitors money and delays their market entry.'1 8 This all has
significant social costs, as the FTC concluded, because when a "competitor chooses
to negotiate a license to and pay royalties on the questionable patent, the costs of
follow-on innovation and commercial development increase due to unjustified
royalties."119
Third, despite the fact that a licensee may suspect that a patent is invalid, if the
monopolist accepts payment for the licensing of a patent that it knows was
fraudulently procured, then it is effectively enforcing its patent. The right to collect
a licensing fee is one of the implicit rights accorded the holders of legitimate
patents. Collecting the royalty is a form of exercising one's patent rights.' 20 More
importantly, in many license agreements--especially those resulting from
settlement negotiations-"the accused infringer always either explicitly or
implicitly acknowledges the patent's validity."' 2 1 Licensing activity can increase
the perception among other potential competitors that the patent is, in fact, valid. 1
22
114. See infra Part E.
115. After all, if the patentee did not intend to enforce its exclusionary rights, she could
simply grant a royalty-free license or sign a covenant not to sue. Cashing the royalty checks
implies a willingness to sue if the checks cease coming. It also smacks of fraud. When one
sells a product, she is representing that she has valid title over the product. Collecting
licensing fees on a patent that the patentholder knows to be invalid is as fraudulent as
receiving rent for real property that the purported landlord does not own.
116. EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
117. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 533
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
118. See Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
119. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 10, executive summary, at 6.
120. It may also represent a hedge against uncertainty.
121. Ciprofloxacin, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
122. Furthermore, because licenses may be relevant to later judicial assessments about
whether a patent is obvious, licensing activity can bolster the patentee's case that its patent is
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Finally, the licensing of the patent can potentially disarm the licensee as a
possible challenger to the patent's fraudulent procurement. Although a licensee can
challenge the licensed patent's validity after the patent is licensed, 23 the licensee
may have the same incentive to conceal the patent's invalidity as the patentee: if
other potential (nonlicensee) competitors believe the patent is valid, it will deter
market entry and may allow the licensee to charge a supra-competitive price.
2 4
And each license lets the patentee avoid potential patent litigation that could result
in the invalidation of the patent. 125 Of course, the holders of fraudulently procured
patents sometimes refuse to license patents to would-be competitors. In some cases,
such refusals to license can be part of an anticompetitive scheme by a firm that has
committed patent fraud. For example, in one litigated case, the dominant firm in a
market obtained its critical patent through fraud and then declined multiple requests
from competitors for licenses, all the while honing a reputation for aggressive
patent enforcement. 26 Firms that claim to have valid patents sometimes explicitly
state that they have policies of refusing to license in order to keep their competitors
out of the market. 1
27
Despite this, courts in patent declaratory judgment suits have reasoned that a
patentee's refusal to license creates no reasonable apprehension of suit on the part
of the party denied a license because the patentee "had no obligation to [license]-
it could do nothing with the patent if it so desired-and [the patentee] had merely
exercised its lawful commercial prerogatives with respect to the patent."'128 As a
matter of determining patent enforcement for antitrust purposes, this analysis is
flawed. By that reasoning, actually threatening litigation in a cease and desist letter
would not constitute enforcement because the owner of a valid patent has a right to
valid. See, e.g., In re Hayes Microcomputer Prods., Inc. Pat. Litig., 982 F.2d 1527, 1544 n.12
(Fed. Cir. 1992) ("USR took a license under the patent. This is supportive of the conclusions
of infringement and nonobviousness.").
123. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007); Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 679.
124. See Thomas, supra note 12, at 335-36 ("Casting doubt on the Supreme Court's view
that licensees 'may often be the only individuals with enough economic incentive to
challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery,' Professor Dreyfuss has explained that
the interests of patent licensees are often aligned with the patent owner in seeking to
maintain the validity of the patent.").
125. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)
("The defendants claim that the American Cuttings Alloy and Fansteel licenses were issued
to avoid patent litigation ...."); see also Borkin, supra note 69, at 643 (describing "the
situation where a patentee, dubious about the strength of his own patent position, establishes
an attractive licensing or pooling system in order to 'buy off' potential infringers while at the
same time preventing his patents from reaching adjudication.").
126. Bourns, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 331 F.3d 704, 714 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pregerson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("During trial, Boums introduced evidence that
throughout its business relationship with Raychem, it sought to dominate the PPTC market
by making it clear to Bourns and other competitors that Bourns could not enter the market
because of Raychem's PPTC patents, which were obtained by fraud. On ten occasions from
1986 to 1993, Raychem rejected Bourns' request for a PPTC manufacturing license.").
127. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
128. Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., No. 96-2274-JWL, 1996 WL
568817, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 16, 1996) (discussing Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. ALZA
Corp., 92 F.3d 1153 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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send such a letter. The issue is whether the refusal to license constitutes
enforcement, not whether holders of valid patents have the legal right to refuse to
license those patents.
The refusal to license a patent should constitute enforcement in Walker Process
litigation for three related reasons. First, to the extent that the refusal to license is
one of the patent rights held by patentholders, such refusal is an exercise of patent
rights. 129 In rejecting some challenges to patent validity spurred by a patentee's
refusal to license, courts have held that the patentee is "under no obligation to
license" and the refusal is part of the patentee's right to exclude others.'
30
Unfortunately, in these cases, courts seem to assume that the patent is valid in order
to deny legal challenges to the patent's validity. 3 1 This presents a real dilemma for
the competitor who is afraid to enter the market with a nonlicensed, infringing
product even when the competitor believes the patent is invalid and perhaps
fraudulently procured. For present purposes, it is important to emphasize the
court's recognition that the refusal to license is an exercise of an exclusionary right.
Such an exercise certainly appears to be enforcement of the patent. Second, the
refusal to license may impose costs on the competitor. The risk-averse competitor
who is denied a license may feel compelled to invent around the patent. 132 This can
entail significant-and unnecessary-costs. 133 Also, being denied a license can
delay competitors from entering into a market controlled by a patent.134 In such
cases, the holder of the invalid patent gets a competitive benefit from its refusal to
license-indeed the same benefit that it would get by explicitly threatening an
infringement suit to enforce a valid patent.
Third, refusing to license a patent implies a threat to litigate. The refusal to
license communicates the message, "I own this intellectual property, I will not
share it, and I will enforce my rights." How else could a reasonable would-be
licensee interpret the refusal to license? By analogy, refusing to sell someone a
movie ticket represents an implied threat that if she enters the theater without a
ticket, the movie theater will take legal action against her. The only reason not to
sell the ticket is to say "stay out." Similarly, the message communicated by a
refusal to license is "I'm exercising my right to exclude you from the market."
129. See United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 670 F.2d 1122,. 1127 (D.C. Cir.
1981) ("A patentee has the right to exclude others from profiting from the patented
invention. This includes the right to suppress the invention while continuing to prevent all
others from using it, to license others, or to refuse to license, and to charge such royalty as
the leverage of the patent monopoly permits." (citations omitted)).
130. Cygnus Therapeutics, 92 F.3d at 1160 ("As for ALZA's refusal to license the
subject matter of the '580 patent, totally apart from the constraints of its contractual
relationship with Janssen, ALZA was under no obligation to license its fentanyl patch. The
patent statute grants a patentee the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
patented invention. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271(a) (1994)." (emphasis omitted)).
131. See id.
132. Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759,
774 (1999) ("That is, despite familiarity with the claimed invention, the patentee and a
license-seeking competitor may simply fail to come to terms. In such a case, the competitor
may decide to design around the patented invention .... 
133. See Leslie, supra note 24, at 119-22.
134. See Cygnus Therapeutics, 92 F.3d at 1157.
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Without the license, many rational rivals will not compete out of fear of potential
infringement litigation.1 35 That is fine if the patent is valid. But if the patentee
knows that it fraudulently procured its patent, exercising the exclusionary right is
illegitimate and represents an antitrust violation if all of the other elements of a
Section Two claim are present.
It might seem inconsistent to argue that both granting a license and refusing to
grant a license constitute enforcement. This seems like a Catch-22 for patent
owners: licensing is enforcement, and refusing to license is enforcement. While
seemingly conflicting, this result makes sense for several reasons. First, both
actions can deter competition and communicate an intent to enforce patents. There
are generally two ways to exercise property rights in real estate and physical goods:
first, refuse to share or to permit entry, and second, charge for entry or use. For
example, a hotel owner can enforce her real property rights by refusing to let a
person check into the hotel or by requiring that a person pay money in exchange for
temporary shelter. A bicycle owner can enforce his personal property rights by
refusing to let another person ride his bike or by charging rent to those who would
like to ride the bike. Property rights in tangibles can be exercised by complete
exclusion or permission to use in exchange for compensation. So it is with patents
that a patentee can exercise her exclusionary rights by denying a license or
charging for one,
Furthermore, antitrust liability stemming from patent enforcement attaches only
to monopolists who know that their patent was acquired by the commission of
fraud against the PTO. It is reasonable to put such firms into a Catch-22. The bind
of "damned if you do, damned if you don't" does not seem so unfair if the person at
issue should, in fact, be damned. A monopolist who procures patents by fraud and
extracts market power from them is such a person. For the monopolist who
commits such a misdeed, it would impose no unfair hardship to require it to inform
would-be licensees that the patent they seek to license is not valid and, therefore,
no license is necessary. Furthermore, the apparent inconsistency is not unfair
because we are merely defining enforcement, not creating liability. Even if a broad
range of licensing activities constitutes enforcement, the patentee who engages in
such activities faces no antitrust consequences unless it is a monopolist that
acquired that patent by fraud.
From a policy standpoint, if collecting licensing fees constitutes patent
enforcement, then it makes sense to treat refusals to license similarly. Otherwise,
patentees may decide not to license their patents since to do so would satisfy the
enforcement requirement of a Walker Process claim-while refusing to license
would not. Legal rules should not unnecessarily discourage licensing activity for
valid patents. Licensing activity is generally beneficial. It can increase competition
when licensees compete on price, service, convenience of location, and other
variables that consumers care about. In some markets, a newly patented product
may compete against an entrenched product. If the new product represents the only
noninfringing substitute for the reigning dominant firm, then licensing can help
topple monopolists.
135. See Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 755 ("Moreover, the potential competitor risks
liability for treble damages if he practices the invention without a license.").
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In any event, a more expansive definition of patent enforcement makes more
sense than the current failure to treat licensing as enforcement. Not only do courts
fail to recognize the enforcement characteristics of licensing-related conduct, they
have constructed a safe harbor whereby a patentee's explicit threats to sue made
directly to an allegedly infringing potential competitor do not constitute
enforcement so long as the threats are made during licensing discussions with the
alleged infringer. 136 The Federal Circuit has held that a patentee who demands a
licensing fee from an alleged infringer has not threatened to enforce its patent when
in response to the competitor asking "Will you enforce your patent?," the patentee
answers "Yes."' 37 The court focused on the license negotiation context of the
litigation threat and characterized the patentee's warning as "merely 'jawboning"'
and "reflexive and obligatory."' 38 Yet, the fact that the answer is reflexive should
not strip the words of their legal significance. For example, when federal
investigators asked Martha Stewart whether she had sold stock based on inside
information, she gave the reflexive answer: no. That response resulted in her
serving time in federal prison. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has diminished
the legal significance of threatening words so that any monopolist with a
fraudulently procured patent who wants to use its patent to deter a competitor
without risking antitrust liability merely needs to offer the competitor a license and
then threaten to sue the competitor should it enter the market. If the threat succeeds,
the patentee can continue to charge the monopoly price, undisciplined by its would-
be rivals. If the threat fails and the competitor enters the market, the monopolist
need not follow through on its threat. Either way, the firm that committed patent
fraud is effectively immune from antitrust scrutiny for its conduct. Whatever the
perceived unfairness of treating both licensing and refusals to license as
enforcement, such a system is preferable to-and more fair than-the current legal
regime that affirmatively protects monopolists who commit patent fraud.
In sum, licensing one's patent should generally constitute enforcement for the
purposes of a Walker Process claim. But there is also a strong argument that
refusing requests for a license could constitute enforcement as well. If the knowing
holder of a fraudulently procured patent wishes to avoid the bind, it can issue
royalty-free licenses. 39 And if a monopolist wishes to charge a royalty for a patent
license, it is not breaking the law; it is merely enforcing its pateit. If the patent is
valid, the monopoly is legitimate and the patentee is safe from liability. If the
patent was procured by fraud, the possibility of Section Two liability looms, as it
should.
136. See InfoSys, Inc. v. Billingnetwork.com, Inc., No. 03 C 3047, 2003 WL 22012687,
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2003) ("Threats of litigation within the context of license
negotiations.., do not create a reasonable apprehension.").
137. Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885,889 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
138. Id.
139. Neil A. Smith, Fraud Upon the Patent Office as a Violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Law, 53 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 423, 435 (1971) ("[A] patent may
dominate a significant part of trade or commerce by its claims, yet if its owner did not
enforce it and gave royalty-free nonexclusive licenses to all who wished them, it is doubtful




Part III documented the ways in which a patentee can, under current law, exploit
a patent to exclude competitors without triggering the enforcement requirement of a
Walker Process claim. When the patent is fraudulently procured and used by a
dominant firm to acquire monopoly power, this should create antitrust liability.
But, unfortunately, in evaluating what constitutes "patent enforcement" for Walker
Process claims-as well as what creates a "reasonable apprehension" of litigation
for declaratory judgment actions, which is currently the same standard-courts
often confuse the relationship between patent rights and enforcement efforts.
Courts seem to think that if the holder of a valid patent can legally engage in
particular conduct then that conduct cannot constitute "patent enforcement" for
purposes of antitrust claims. Some courts mock the position "that a reasonable
apprehension of suit arises when a patentee does nothing more than exercise its
lawful commercial prerogatives and, in so doing, puts a competitor in the position
of having to choose between abandoning a particular business venture or bringing
matters to a head by engaging in arguably infringing activity." 14°
Such reasoning misses the point completely: we are trying to determine what
conduct constitutes patent enforcement, not what conduct the owners of valid
patents can legally engage in. Holders of legitimate patents have the right to sue for
infringement, but that does not mean that suing is not enforcement. In too many
instances, courts implicitly assume a patent is valid and then use that assumption to
deny standing to competitors to challenge the patent's validity on the false basis
that any activity permissible for the holder of a valid patent does not constitute
enforcement. 141
Judges mistakenly perceive that competitors are challenging the patentee's
enforcement efforts themselves as somehow illegal. Courts opine that patentholders
have the right to do these acts-acts that include announcing their patents, warning
infringers, intimidating competitors' business partners, and licensing their
intellectual property rights-and thus some judges apparently consider such
conduct beyond reproach. But antitrust plaintiffs are not attacking these
enforcement measures as illegal in themselves. They are attempting to show patent
enforcement merely because courts interpret enforcement as a necessary element of
a Walker Process claim. 142 It is the monopolist's fraudulent procurement of the
patent that forms the foundation of the Section Two violation. The holder of a
fraudulently procured patent has no legitimate exclusionary rights and it
fundamentally violates both antitrust and patent law principles to allow such a firm
to exclude competitors. 143
140. Cygnus Therapeutics Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
141. See, e.g., Citizen Elecs. Co. v. Osram GmBH, 377 F. Supp. 2d 149, 156 (D.D.C.
2005).
142. I have argued previously that the enforcement requirement should be eliminated
altogether. Leslie, supra note 24.
143. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 49, at 268.
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G. A New Test for Declaratory Judgments, but the Old Problems Remain
The Supreme Court has recently rejected the "reasonable apprehension of suit"
test for declaratory judgments in Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.144 The
Federal Circuit immediately acknowledged that Medlmmune overruled the Federal
Circuit's "reasonable-apprehension-of-suit" test, 145 but it did not offer a glimpse at
how it would proceed in light of the overruling' 46 until half a year after
Medlmmune, in Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc.14 7 In Benitec, the
patentee sued its competitor for infringement and when the defendant
counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the patent was invalid (as well as
arguing that the defendant's process was not infringing), the patentee voluntarily
dismissed its suit and said that it would not sue the competitor again for its pre-
dismissal conduct. 14 8 The district court, in turn, dismissed the competitor's
declaratory action.149 The Federal Circuit affirmed, despite the fact that the
competitor was embarking on a new program, which the patentee had
communicated it believed would infringe its patent.150 The Federal Circuit
acknowledged that MedImmune rejected the reasonable-apprehension-of-suit
test. ' 5' The Federal Circuit aptly quoted MedImmune for the rule of law:
[I]n order for a court to have jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action:
'the dispute [must] be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests; and that it [must] be real and substantial
and admit of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Basically, the question in each case is whether the
facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
144. 127 S. Ct. 764, 774 n. 11 (2007) ("The [Federal Circuit's] reasonable-apprehension-
of-suit test... conflicts with... Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S.
270, 273 (1941)... and Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937) ... [and]
is also in tension with Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 98 (1993),
which held that appellate affirmance of a judgment of noninfringement, eliminating any
apprehension of suit, does not moot a declaratory judgment counterclaim of patent
invalidity.").
145. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2007) ("Thus, because the Supreme Court in Medlmmune cautioned that our declaratory
judgment 'reasonable-apprehension-of-suit' test 'contradict[s]' and 'conflicts' with its
precedent, these Federal Circuit tests have been 'overruled by . . . an intervening . . .
Supreme Court decision."') (alteration in original).
146. See Sandisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
2007) ("In this case, we address only the first prong of this court's two-part test. There is no
dispute that the second prong is met. We therefore leave to another day the effect of
MedImmune, if any, on the second prong.").
147. 495 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
148. Id. at 1343.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1342.
151. Id. at 1343.
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controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.' 52
However, the Benitec majority went on to hold that the federal courts had no
declaratory judgment jurisdiction in the case because, as the allegedly infringing
new project had not yet been launched, the competitor could not meet "its burden
of showing that it is engaged in any present activity that could subject it to a claim
of infringement" and thus it could not "meet the immediacy and reality requirement
of MedImmune."1
5 3
The majority misread both the words and spirit of the MedImmune opinion.
First, while the controversy must be immediate and real, that does not necessarily
mean that the alleged infringement must be already occurring and certainly does
not mean that an actual infringement lawsuit must be in place. Second, the Benitec
dissent notes that the Supreme Court in MedImmune "emphasized the importance
the Declaratory Judgment Act plays in protecting against the Hobson's choice of
abandoning lawful endeavors or risking liability for infringement."'' 54 In contrast,
the majority simply re-inflicted that precise dilemma on would-be competitors.
Based on its misreading of MedImmune, the Federal Circuit has essentially
changed the name but not the substance of its approach to denying competitors
access to courts in order to challenge suspect patents. The Federal Circuit
acknowledged that the competitor may not be able to secure necessary financing for
the allegedly infringing project absent a declaratory judgment, but proceeded to
decline jurisdiction until the infringement actually occurs, the specific outcome that
both the Declaratory Judgment Act and the MedImmune decision sought to prevent.
In short, even with the reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test officially scuttled,
the same problem endures: the standard for declaratory judgments-and
consequently the definition of patent enforcement-remains overly constricted.
While Part III lays out examples in which the narrow definition of enforcement
under current law allows patentees to exclude competitors with impunity, the
activities canvassed here do not automatically constitute enforcement for Walker
Process purposes, as Part IV explains.
IV. PATENT ENFORCEMENT IS CONTEXTUAL
The current judicial approach to defining patent enforcement is formulaic: If the
patentee does not threaten to sue an infringer explicitly, then its conduct does not
constitute patent enforcement for Walker Process purposes. As a result, the
threatening words and activities of a patentee can successfully deter would-be
competitors and yet-in many judges' minds-not represent a sufficiently direct
and explicit threat to allow the competitor to pursue an antitrust claim based on the
patent's fraudulent origins. The problem is largely a function of judges failing to
appreciate the business significance of veiled threats and the judicial practice of
considering each alleged enforcement action in a vacuum, devoid of context.
152. Id. at 1344 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted in original).
153. Id. at 1348.
154. Id. at 1350 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
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Context is critical to understanding whether a patentee has threatened to enforce
its patent in a manner that antitrust law cares about. First, the social norms of the
industry in which the patentee and alleged infringer compete are important. For
example, in many information technology markets, the first cease-and-desist letter
from a patentholder is often disregarded and patent litigation is not viewed as an
all-consuming threat. 15  In contrast, such letters are taken very seriously in
pharmaceutical markets. ' 56 As a result, what might constitute patent enforcement in
some industries or markets would not in others.
Second, judges need to consider the totality of the patentee's conduct. Some
courts look at evidence in isolation and miss the overall context. 157 But holders of
fraudulently procured patents sometimes engage in a comprehensive, multi-
pronged scheme to intimidate would-be competitors. A wide-ranging strategy can
include public announcements that one's patent is valid, veiled accusations that a
competitor is infringing, a few well-publicized suits against minor infringers, and
threatening insinuations to rivals' business partners-all culminating in an offer to
license at a high royalty rate. The context in which each threatening act occurs is
significant. After all, a patentee's reference to its previous infringement suits
coupled with an allegation that its competitor is also infringing is much more
threatening than either statement alone. Yet the Federal Circuit has used res
judicata to isolate a patentee's threats and prevent an appreciation of the big
picture. In Citizen Electronics, the alleged infringer brought a declaratory judgment
action, which the court dismissed, finding the patentee's conduct not sufficiently
threatening. 158 Following that dismissal, the patentee issued a report on its website
containing more oblique threats of infringement litigation. 59 When the alleged
infringer brought a second declaratory judgment complaint based on the cumulative
effect of the patentee's aggressive posture, the Federal Circuit upheld the district
court's use of res judicata to estop the challenger from relying on any of the events
prior to the first dismissal. Because the post-dismissal facts were insufficient on
their own to establish a controversy, the targeted competitor could not challenge the
dominant firm's suspect patent. The court's decision makes it difficult to show
context in these cases. Once the patentee gets a declaratory judgment complaint
dismissed for lack of sufficient proof of imminent enforcement action, the patentee
has a clean slate from which it can make oblique threats designed to deter market
entry.
155. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, - MICH. ST. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2008).
156. The threat of infringement litigation is viewed more seriously in pharmaceutical
markets, in part, because the potential infringement damages may far exceed the profits that
the prospective infringer could make from entering the market and charging a competitive
price.
157. See, e.g., Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc. v. Glaverbel S.A., 861 F. Supp. 653, 660-
61 (N.D. 111. 1994) ("But when the Press Release is viewed alone-as it must be because it is
really Northlake's only evidence in opposition to the current Rule 56 motion-it is un
reasonable to construe the document as supporting any such inference.")(emphasis in
original).
158. Citizen Elecs. Co. v. Osram GmBH, 377 F. Supp. 2d 149 (D.D.C. 2005).
159. Citizen Elecs. Co. v. Osram GmBH, 225 F. App'x 890, 892 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
("[O]bjective in taking legal action against Citizen and issuing warnings to Dominant is to
prevent unauthorized use of our technology.").
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Even without these procedural machinations, in many cases, federal judges seem
to compartmentalize the various threatening aspects of a particular situation and
thus fail to see the big picture. Thus, courts have held that a patentee's letter to a
competitor does not threaten litigation even when the letter states that the
competitor's product "may infringe" the writer's patent, that the competitor should
"cease and desist from making, using, selling, leasing, importing or offering for
sale or lease" the infringing products, and that the patentee "has aggressively
enforced its right to exclude others" from the market. 160 In short, incorporating
context into the analysis requires appreciating the cumulative anti-competitive
effects of individual acts.
Third, judges should consider the actual exclusionary effects of the patentee's
conduct. Language that may seem facially harmless to a federal judge often speaks
in a well-known code within each industry. As the leading treatise on antitrust and
intellectual property notes, "the Federal Circuit seems to discount the possibility
that a patentee could threaten competitors with sufficiently indirect language that it
avoids provoking a suit for declaratory judgment. Patentees have grown skilled at
making such indirect threats over the years."' 61 To determine whether a patentee's
words and actions are innocuous or menacing, courts should examine the concrete
consequences of the conduct on competitors, the patentee's intended targets.
Federal judges sometimes cannot appreciate how business threats are made and
how reasonable people respond to such statements. 162
The Indium litigation illustrates how appreciating the context of a patentee's
conduct can properly inform the court's analysis of the enforcement inquiry. When
the district court first considered whether the defendant Semi-Alloys had enforced
its patent against Indium in a manner that met the Walker Process requirement, the
judge concluded that "the allegations that Semi-Alloys sued other competitors on
the patents, offered to discuss a license with Indium, and sued Indium for unfair
competition do not amount to enforcement or a threat of enforcement of its patents
against Indium."163 However, the court allowed Indium an opportunity to amend its
complaint. While Indium did not present additional allegations of enforcement
activities, the court-when considering Semi-Alloys' motion to dismiss the
amended complaint-was impressed that the amended complaint "place[d] the
previously alleged acts in a new light by alleging, in considerable detail, the
business context in which such conduct occurred."' 164 In his second opinion, the
judge reasoned that "it would be a mistake to interpret 'enforcement' too narrowly,
and thereby limit the remedy of a Walker Process type antitrust action to
competitors that have actually been sued or threatened with suit by the
defendant."'' 65 The court considered the context, namely the patentee's intent,
160. SGM Elettronica, S.r.L v. Vari-Lite, Inc., No. 99CIV.11684(BSJ), 2000 WL
977701, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2000).
161. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST 11-
15 (2002).
162. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
163. Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1344, 1353 (N.D.N.Y.
1983).
164. Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 608, 611 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
165. Id. at 614 ("The concept [of patent enforcement] must be broad enough to afford a
remedy not only to those who actually produced an infringing article and were forced to stop
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cumulative conduct, and its exclusionary effect. Thus, in the first instance, the court
reasoned that the alleged infringer's allegations were insufficient, but after the
amended complaint put the patentee's action in context, the same court held that
that same conduct was sufficient because the court understood from the context the
potentially exclusionary nature of the conduct. When courts appreciate context, the
concept of enforcement expands to more appropriately include the actual effects of
the patentee's deeds.
In short, context is critical. Antitrust law should shun sweeping categorical rules
that hold certain types of activity are never patent enforcement as a matter of law.
Courts need to ask the contextual question of whether this conduct in this industry
is effectively enforcement of a patent. If enforcement is truly an issue, then judges
should take extra effort to consider the context of the patentee's conduct. While this
may add a layer of complexity, it is far better than maintaining an artificially
narrow conception of patent enforcement that allows holders of fraudulently
procured patents to exercise ill-gained market power while evading antitrust
scrutiny.
Adopting a contextual approach to defining patent enforcement does not mean
that the current definition of patent enforcement for Walker Process claims should
be completely abandoned. Instead, courts should recognize two separate routes for
satisfying the Walker Process enforcement requirement: per se and contextual. On
the one hand, some conduct-filing an infringement suit or explicitly threatening to
do so---constitutes patent enforcement as a matter of law. This per se approach to
defining patent enforcement would spare courts from needing to examine context
when the patent enforcement is clear. Conversely, however, when the patentee's
conduct falls short of enforcement per se, the antitrust plaintiff should still be
permitted to argue that the patentee's conduct was exclusionary given the context in
which it occurred. The Federal Circuit has been focusing exclusively on per se
enforcement-in other words-what conduct necessarily satisfies Walker Process'
enforcement requirement. But the issue of contextual enforcement-what conduct
might satisfy the enforcement requirement, depending on the surrounding facts and
circumstances-has not been well-developed.
In sum, when applying Walker Process's enforcement requirement, courts
should appreciate how patentees harness the exclusionary power of patents beyond
direct, explicit threats and the initiation of infringement litigation. The concept of
patent enforcement must be expanded to deny the benefits of reduced competition
to monopolists who maintain their market power by holding fraudulently procured
patents. Courts have essentially created a loophole that allows patentees who
commit patent fraud to exercise their patent rights without triggering antitrust
liability. Part V explains why expanding the concept of patent enforcement in
antitrust law is a wise way to address patent fraud.
by infringement suit or the threat thereof, but also to those who were ready, willing, and able




V. ADDRESSING PATENT FRAUD BY EXPANDING THE DEFINITION
OF "PATENT ENFORCEMENT"
As currently construed, the Walker Process cause of action requires a would-be
competitor to infringe the monopolist's patent and then wait until it is sued-or
receives a sufficiently explicit threat of litigation-before that competitor can bring
an antitrust action. But this path to challenging the monopolist's conduct is too
risky because it requires an excluded competitor to open itself up to potentially
staggering infringement liability. Under the current legal test, an excluded
competitor who is risk averse may never have the opportunity to bring an antitrust
suit against a monopolist that maintains market power through fraudulently
procured patents.
This Part explores how narrowly defining the patent enforcement that must be
shown to succeed in a Walker Process case makes patent fraud a rational strategy
for a firm concerned only with maximizing its profits. It then notes how
monopolists can manipulate legal rules to reduce the amount of successful Walker
Process litigation while still exploiting fraudulently procured patents to exclude
competitors. Finally, it shows how expanding the definition of patent enforcement
can help restore the balance between antitrust law and patent law, such that
anticompetitive conduct is condemned without hindering legitimate patent activity.
A. Patent Fraud Is Cost-Beneficial Under Current Law
Given the narrow definitions of patent enforcement that courts have adopted for
antitrust claims, the current legal regime has made patent fraud potentially cost-
beneficial for many firms. Unfortunately, if the expected benefits of fraud outweigh
the costs, then risk-neutral firms concerned only with profit-maximization will
rationally commit fraud in their patent applications. This simple calculation might
help explain the number of invalid patents in the American marketplace. The
potential benefits of patent fraud are significant. A fraudulently procured patent
may give the patentholder the power to charge monopoly prices by deterring
competitors from entering the market for products covered by the patent.
Depending on the market, this can represent tens of millions of dollars in ill-gotten
gains. In contrast, the cost of obtaining a fraudulently procured patent should be the
same as acquiring a legitimate patent. A patent applicant likely expends no
additional money by, for example, concealing an invalidating prior sale or public
use.
The current system does not adequately deter and punish patent fraud. First, the
probability of being caught is low. Because patent fraud often involves the
concealment of largely private information, competitors or government officials
may never discover that a patent was fraudulently obtained. Even if invalidity or
fraud appears likely, it is often too difficult to successfully challenge the suspect
patent in court because evidentiary standards significantly favor the
patentholder. 166
Second, the consequences of patent fraud are insufficiently low. This is not to
say that the consequences are minor or insignificant; they are simply low relative to
166. See Leslie, supra note 24, at 133-34.
2008]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the potential gains from successfully committing fraud and wielding the patent
against competitors. The patent system does not affirmatively punish fraud as a
matter of course; it simply takes the invalid patent away.' 67 This may be a
significant consequence, but it merely places the deprived patentholder in the
position she would have been in had she never committed the fraud in the first
place.
For any illegal enterprise, deterrence of the unlawful activity can be undermined
by either a low probability of detection or insufficiently low punishment upon
detection. The patent system is currently characterized by both of these
components. Thus, it is hardly surprising that some firms commit fraud.
Given that monopolization through patent fraud can be cost-beneficial, one
might expect Walker Process plaintiffs to reveal a significant number of
fraudulently procured patents. But while fraudulently procured patents are
sometimes exposed through antitrust litigation that proceeds when a patentholder
has sued--or sufficiently threatened-an infringing competitor (so that the
enforcement element of the antitrust claim is satisfied), 168 the success rate for
Walker Process suits appears to be relatively low. 169 Many factors contribute to this
relatively low success rate. First, infringement defendants reflexively make
antitrust counterclaims, even when there is no basis for the accusation. These
Walker Process claims fail because they should. Second, a Walker Process plaintiff
must make its case regarding the patent fraud element with clear and convincing
evidence, not a mere preponderance. 17 As a result, some antitrust claims fail even
if the defendants' conduct should, if properly proven, lead to liability. Third, some
patent applicants may secure a patent by committing fraud but end up receiving a
patent that does not confer monopoly power 17' and, thus, does not implicate section
2 of the Sherman Act and the fraud will not be exposed through Walker Process
litigation. Fourth, the threat of antitrust liability may actually reduce the amount of
patent fraud. 1
72
167. While the reexamination procedure may bring greater accuracy to the patent system,
it probably will not provide a meaningful deterrent to fraud in the first place because it does
not punish bad behavior.
168. See, e.g., Arcade, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., No. CIV-1-88-141, 1991 WL
185155 (E.D. Tenn. July 2, 1991); Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 591 F. Supp.
608, 613 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[P]laintiff alleges that it lost profits of 'at least about $12.8
million' that it could have earned through sales of tack-welded frame lids, had it not been
restrained by Semi-Alloy's [enforcement of invalid patents in violation of the Sherman
Act.]").
169. HOVENKAMPETAL.,supra note 161.
170. Lawrence B. Dodds, Fraud on the Patent Office, 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 345, 346-47
(1974) ("First, the decisions uniformly hold that a charge of fraud on the Patent Office can
be proved only by clear and convincing evidence, not by mere preponderance of the
evidence.") (emphasis in original).
171. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
172. S. William Cochran, Historical Review of Fraud in Patent Procurement: The
Standards and Procedures for Doing Business Before the Patent Office, 52 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'v 71, 77 (1970) ("The threat of incurring treble damages might make everyone having
business before the Office more fraud conscious, and this alone may have the effect of
reducing the incidence of possible fraud.").
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This Part proposes an additional explanation for why Walker Process victories
appear few in number: patentees that procure patents by fraud can too easily avoid
antitrust scrutiny by gaming the enforcement requirement. If a firm knows that its
patent was procured by fraud-and that there is a fair probability of that fact being
exposed in litigation-then it would not enforce its patent through infringement
litigation. Instead, it would find ways to harness the anticompetitive power of the
fraudulently procured patent without actually enforcing it in a manner that could
enable a competitor to bring either a declaratory judgment action or a Walker
Process suit. Maintaining a patent as a head on a pike can simultaneously deter
competitors while not leading to Walker Process lawsuits, as Part Ill demonstrated.
If a new competitor ultimately enters the market despite the presence of the
patent--either because the new entrant is unaware of the patent, believes that its
product is noninfringing, or concludes that the patent was fraudulently procured-
then the rational monopolist who knows its patent was acquired by fraud would
simply do nothing. The patentee neither sues nor explicitly threatens to sue; it does
nothing that would subject it to an antitrust suit. At a minimum, the fraudulently
procured patent probably delayed entry as the competitor had to seek counsel,
determine the patent's validity, and debate whether to enter the market despite the
possibility of drawing an infringement suit. This delay alone could be worth
millions in ill-gotten gains to the monopolist who possesses an invalid patent. 173
A less risk-averse monopolist could actually sue an allegedly infringing
competitor while minimizing scrutiny of its patent's validity.'74 If the patentee sued
for infringement and the alleged infringer made an antitrust counterclaim, then if
the patentee feared discovery of its fraud, it could settle the litigation. Even without
the threat of antitrust liability, the patentee would be better off giving the
competitor a royalty-free license than risking having its patent declared invalid in
court. 175 Providing a royalty-free (or reduced royalty) license also saves the
patentee its litigation costs and potential antitrust liability. In sum, only patentees
who are relatively confident about the validity of their patents would litigate the
issue to completion. 176
In short, strategic patentees who have fraudulently procured patents and are
therefore vulnerable to Walker Process liability can pursue one of two courses of
action: exercise the exclusionary power of their patent in a manner that courts
(improperly) do not recognize as enforcement for antitrust purposes or settle any
litigation that does occur. Taking either of these tacks would result in no published
173. See Leslie, supra note 24, at 123.
174. It may seem odd for a patentee that knows its patent was fraudulently procured to
sue for infringement. To the extent that patent plaintiffs perceive that Walker Process
counterclaims are perfunctory, any firm should be rationally reluctant to bring an
infringement suit on a fraudulently procured patent. It would be better to keep the patent as a
talisman--threatening competitors without ever entering a courtroom as either a plaintiff (in
an infringement suit) or a defendant (in an antitrust suit).
175. While a competitor would rather have antitrust damages than a mere royalty-free
license, the competitor who has not yet discovered definitive proof of patent fraud and who
is facing infringement liability would probably welcome a quick settlement of the
infringement litigation and its Walker Process counterclaim.
176. A firm that did not commit fraud or knowingly enforce an invalid patent, but was
unsure about whether its patent could survive attack in court, would settle the case.
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opinion finding Walker Process liability. Consequently, the small number of
reported Walker Process victories by plaintiffs may be evidence that monopolists
who commit patent fraud are successfully gaming the system. Because patentees
can avoid liability relatively easily through creative "enforcement" and settlement
strategies, the limited number of reported cases finding Walker Process liability
does not prove an absence of patent fraud.
Finally, it bears noting that the patent system's internal mechanisms for vetting
bad patents are inadequate, which probably increases the attractiveness of
committing fraud for some firms. On the front-end, patent examiners do not have
sufficient time, training, and information to reject all patent applications that should
be rejected. 177 Post-issuance review fares little better. Historically, the PTO's
reexamination procedure has been underutilized.17 8 Recent changes in the
reexamination system are unlikely to solve the problems with the older system. 1
79
More importantly, the reexamination procedure does not provide any mechanism
for requiring the patentee to pay damages that would compensate a competitor for
the injuries inflicted by knowing maintenance of a monopoly by a patentholder
before the reexamination, and thus it cannot adequately deter either fraud or the
knowing possession of invalid patents.
Private parties are generally hampered in their efforts to vanquish fraudulently
procured patents. It has long been assumed that infringement suits will effectively
vet such patents (and those invalid for other reasons). 18 0 It is tempting to say that a
potential competitor who believes the dominant firm's patent was fraudulently
procured can simply enter the market and, if the need arises, defend against an
infringement suit. 18' Alternatively, in theory, competitors can use declaratory
judgment actions to expose invalid patents. 182 Unfortunately, collective action
problems plague private litigation because challenging patent validity costs money
that will not be entirely recouped since the benefits of patent invalidation flow to
the market at large and not simply to the firm that mounts the legal challenge.
8 3
What rational firm would voluntarily incur litigation costs and risk debilitating
177. See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
178. See Leslie, supra note 24, at 140-42.
179. Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative
Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARv. J.L. & TEcH. 1, 74 (1997) ("As crucial as
these changes may be to creating an administrative review system that provides a litigation
alternative, liberalizing third-party participation will accomplish little unless accompanied by
more fundamental reforms. Unfortunately, the third-party participation provisions are
embedded in a second-generation reexamination scheme that was designed primarily to cure
governmental defects, and only secondarily to provide a litigation alternative.").
180. Roscoe Steffen, Invalid Patents and Price Control, 56 YALE L.J. 1, 11 (1946)
("After all, it is a tacit assumption of our patent laws that in a competitive economy the
infringement suit will ordinarily suffice to purge the patent system of invalid patents.").
181. See Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 265 (7th Cir. 1984)
("[A] patent known to the trade to be invalid will not discourage competitors from making
the patented product or using the patented process.").
182. Though, as Part I demonstrated, it can be difficult to pursue a declaratory judgment
action in the absence of a direct, explicit threat by the patentholder to sue the competitor for
infringement.
183. Leslie, supra note 24 at 148-49; Thomas, supra note 12 at 334-35.
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infringement liability when the benefits of invalidating a suspect patent would be
shared equally with its own potential competitors who can simply free ride on its
efforts? "4
In sum, the patent system has serious problems on the front-end and the back-
end. As currently configured, it simply cannot prevent fraudulently procured
patents from issuing in the first place or remove them from the marketplace once
they have issued. As Professor Thomas aptly notes, "[t]he entire menu of domestic
patent challenges, including protests, public use proceedings, two varieties of
reexaminations, and declaratory judgments includes not a single vehicle capable of
animating would-be patent protestors." 85 This is not to say that patent reform to
address these issues within the patent system is not a wise endeavor-it is.
However, as the following section argues, patent reform cannot adequately solve
the problem on its own.
B. An Antitrust Solution
Antitrust litigation can address the problem of fraudulently procured patents
more effectively than can the patent system alone. For it to do so, however, the
conception of when a monopolist is enforcing its patent must be broadened.
Expanding the definition of patent enforcement for Walker Process claims has
several advantages in reducing patent fraud. First, it provides the proper incentive
for excluded competitors to sue to expose fraudulently procured patents held by
monopolists. Currently, patent law inhibits firms from bringing declaratory
judgment actions or from entering the market while inviting an infringement suit in
hopes of exposing a rival's fraudulently procured patent. The litigation costs of
such a course of action are high and the rewards are relatively low-a competitive
market for all but no individual remedy. In contrast, a victorious antitrust plaintiff
receives treble damages for sales lost because of the fraudulently procured patent,
as well as attorney's fees. While the whole market benefits from the invalidation of
a fraudulently procured patent, the illegally excluded competitor can appropriate
direct benefits that provide greater individual incentive to challenge the suspect
patent through an antitrust suit than by seeking a declaratory judgment of patent
invalidity.
Second, an antitrust approach with a broader conception of enforcement can
render patent fraud not cost-beneficial. Current law may discourage active
enforcement of patents procured by fraud, but it does not adequately deter
monopolists from committing fraud upon the PTO in the first place because firms
can exploit the patent's exclusionary power while shielding it from judicial scrutiny
by avoiding the limited conduct that a court will hold constitutes enforcement. 186 A
more realistic, expanded definition of patent enforcement would reduce the
184. As with the enforcement requirement in Walker Process cases, the "reasonable
apprehension" test for standing to pursue declaratory judgment actions is too rigid to satisfy.
The FTC recognized in its report on patents and competition that "current standing
requirements prevent a potentially infringing party from determining in advance the merits
of a questionable patent." FTC INNOVATON REPORT, supra note 10, ch. 3, at 22.
185. Thomas, supra note 12, at 331 ("Each sort of revocation procedure instead includes
a unique, readily identifiable defect that almost wholly suppresses potential users.").
186. See supra Part Il.
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incentive to commit fraud for two related reasons. First, the monopolist would not
be able to exclude competitors using the "soft enforcement" measures discussed in
Part III. Second, when the monopolist's fraudulent patent is exposed, antitrust law
exacts a meaningful punishment. While a declaratory judgment could invalidate a
patent, antitrust's trebled damages could disgorge the monopoly profits-and then
some-from a firm that illegally monopolized a relevant market through fraudulent
procurement of a patent. 8 7 With an expanded definition of patent enforcement,
firms could no longer acquire patents through fraud and then charge a monopoly
price while excluding competitors through vague threats that do not allow antitrust
scrutiny in a Walker Process claim. The proposed change in the understanding of
enforcement would raise both the probability and the cost of detection, which
would make patent fraud less likely to be cost-beneficial.
Third, antitrust litigation focuses social resources on those patents most likely to
distort competitive markets. 8 8 While investing more money at the front-end of the
patent examination process might screen out some invalid patents, most patents do
not confer market power and indeed are never used in any manner. 8 9 It is thus not
cost-effective to invest resources in eliminating all worthless or fraudulently
procured patents. An antitrust solution insures that only those invalid patents that
actually injure competition are punished. Patent fraud may be an affront to the
PTO, but the principal economic injury is to the marketplace and the competitive
process. Competitive injuries are better addressed through antitrust law than patent
law. Antitrust law also allows injunctive relief to restore competitive markets. 190
Expanding the definition of patent enforcement for antitrust purposes may seem
too modest a proposal to eliminate a significant number of fraudulently procured
patents. A more realistic definition of patent enforcement for Walker Process
litigation should expose and eliminate some fraudulently procured patents held by
monopolists, but not all or even most of them. After all, if competitors do not know
that a patent was fraudulently procured, then this reinterpretation of enforcement
would likely provide little help. However, the effectiveness of any proposal must
be weighed against the social costs of responding too aggressively to a problem.
Modesty can be a virtue over excess.
The intersection of antitrust and intellectual property law involves a middle
ground where two areas of law sometimes conflict. Fraudulently procured patents
represent one area where antitrust and patent scholars should easily reach
agreement: fraudulently procured patents disrupt the patent system and the
competitive marketplace. But there is no consensus about how to address the
problem. At the extreme, the surest way to eliminate all fraudulently procured
patents would be to eliminate all patents. Of course, this is unacceptable because
society would lose the innovation created by our patent system. In confronting
invalid patents that create illegal monopolies, antitrust law should minimize the
187. Disgorgement is more likely if consumers were granted standing to bring follow-on
Walker Process suits.
188. FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 10, ch. 5, at 28 ("Litigation is a mechanism
for focusing enhanced attention on those patents that are most likely to hold commercial
significance and for weeding out from this group those patents that should not have been
granted.").
189. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
190. Leslie, supra note 24, at 173-74.
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number of such invalid patents without reducing legitimate patenting activity.
Expanding the legal definition of patent enforcement can expose invalid patents
without punishing valid patents. As a result, the modesty of the proposal is a major
part of its beauty.
In reality, defining patent enforcement more broadly is a second-best solution. I
have argued previously that the enforcement requirement in Walker Process
litigation is itself suspect. Because patents-even invalid patents--can exclude
competitors without any affirmative enforcement activity by the patentholder, it
would be efficient and achieve the goals of both antitrust law and the patent system
to eliminate the enforcement requirement altogether. 19' Some may believe that such
an approach would require Congressional or Supreme Court action. However, an
argument can be made that the enforcement language in the Walker Process
opinion is dicta. Despite the prominence of the enforcement requirement, it is
unclear why the Supreme Court made antitrust liability dependent on patent
enforcement. Part of the answer may lie in the facts of Walker Process and how the
government framed the issues. In his oral argument before the Supreme Court in
Walker Process, the government's attorney noted that under its theory of the case,
the antitrust plaintiff
will have to show not only that they had the patent, but that they enforced it
against the petitioner in this case. In other words, not merely the possession of
the patent, but the allegations that they made that they lost a great deal of
business, in fact, that they actually were excluded from the market.192
Today, the need to show actual exclusion from the market is a necessary part of the
inquiry into causal antitrust injury,193 a concept that was not fully developed at the
time of Walker Process. Under this reading, "patent enforcement" is merely a
shorthand for exclusionary effects. That the actual filing of an infringement suit
represented the enforcement in Walker Process does not mean that every Walker
Process claim actually requires such enforcement, as opposed to requiring the
antitrust plaintiff to prove exclusionary effects from the fraudulently procured
patent. That, after all, is the essence of antitrust law. But as long as courts retain the
enforcement requirement instead of eliminating it, the definition of patent
enforcement should be broadened.
One further virtue of expanding the definition of patent enforcement is that
lower courts can do so on their own without attempting to characterize the Walker
Process enforcement language as pure dicta. Expanding the definition of
191. Id. at 171-75.
192. Oral Argument of United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9,
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (No. 13), in
17 ANTITRUST LAW: MAJOR BRIEFs AND ORAL ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1955 TERM-1975 TERM 751 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.,
1979). This suggests that there has to be enforcement by the holder of the invalid patent, but
the DOJ's attorney did not define what precisely he meant by "enforcing" the invalid patent.
Although he suggests that it requires something more than "merely" possessing the invalid
patent, he then implies that the test is met by a competitor showing lost business. As Part
Three argued, this can be done without actually filing a lawsuit.
193. See infra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
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enforcement is a more moderate and quickly attainable route to using antitrust law
to ferret out fraudulently procured patents held by monopolists. If lower courts feel
unable to abandon the enforcement inquiry altogether, then they should at least
interpret patent enforcement more realistically so as to encompass the myriad ways
that patent owners use their patents to exclude and harm competitors. While the
Supreme Court stated that there must be enforcement, the Court has not dictated
what efforts by a patentee constitute enforcement sufficient to trigger Walker
Process liability. The restrictive approach of current law, detailed in Part III, has
been developed by lower courts interpreting the Walker Process opinion. Thus,
lower courts have much greater latitude to expand the concept of patent
enforcement than to eliminate the patent enforcement requirement from Walker
Process claims altogether.
In sum, the antitrust system presents an effective mechanism to address patent
fraud. This leaves one major issue-whether increasing the possibility of antitrust
liability creates the risk of false positives and, thus, deters legitimate patenting
activity, which the following section addresses.
C. Proper Filters to Protect Innocent Patentholders
Antitrust law should not create disincentives for firms and individuals to patent
their inventions and enforce their valid patents. The prospect of temporary
monopoly profits creates a substantial incentive for firms to invest in research and
development that leads to the development of valuable new products and processes.
Antitrust law should not impede this incentive structure. Some might argue that if
patent enforcement is defined too broadly for the purposes of antitrust claims,
inventors could be more reluctant to seek patents or to exercise their legitimate
rights. No firm-whether it owns patents or not-wants to draw an antitrust suit.
All litigation is costly, and antitrust damages can pack a significant punch.
94
Fearing antitrust litigation and potential liability, patentees may be less willing or
eager to engage in licensing activity or to flaunt the range and importance of their
patents. This could reduce the expected value of patents and make investments in
innovation less attractive.
Thus, there needs to be an effective screen against frivolous Walker Process
litigation. But that screen should not be an overly narrow definition of
"enforcement" because that approach purges legitimate suits and unnecessarily
protects fraudulent patents. Importantly, antitrust law has other, more appropriate
filters against false positives in Walker Process cases. First, the fact that. antitrust
liability only exists against patent-holding monopolists will eliminate many
potential frivolous Walker Process claims.' 95 For example, Walker Process
defendants often prevail at summary judgment because the plaintiff fails to define
the relevant market properly 96 or does not establish the patentee's monopoly
194. However, the concern is not simply that a competitor would necessarily win its
lawsuit, but that it would bring antitrust litigation to harass a dominant firm and perhaps
even secure a settlement.
195. Also, those patentees with a dangerous probability of acquiring monopoly power
could be subject to an attempted monopolization claim.
196. See, e.g., Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc. v. Glaverbel S.A., 861 F. Supp. 653, 663
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power in that market, even if properly defined. 97 Even a defendant that acquires its
patent through fraud on the PTO-and is actually found guilty of inequitable
conduct-will not face section 2 liability if its market share is low.1
98
In addition, even if the plaintiff can prove that the patentee is a monopolist, the
plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the monopolist's
patent is invalid, an extremely demanding standard. 199 More importantly, it is not
enough that the patent is invalid; the plaintiff must prove that the monopolist
committed fraud against the PTO to obtain the patent.2°° Establishing patent fraud
is notoriously difficult. The plaintiff must prove:
(1) a representation of a material fact, (2) the falsity of that representation, (3)
the intent to deceive or, at least, a state of mind so reckless as to the
consequences that it is held to be the equivalent of intent (scienter), (4) a
justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation by the party deceived which
induces him to act thereon, and (5) injury to the party deceived as a result of his
reliance on the misrepresentation.
201
Walker Process defendants routinely prevail because the plaintiff cannot prove
fraud.202
Finally, a Walker Process plaintiff can succeed only if it suffered antitrust injury
caused by the monopolist's fraud against the PTO. 20 3 This causation requirement,
not an overly narrow concept of enforcement, should be doing the heavy lifting of
filtering out inappropriate plaintiffs. For example, the causation standard addresses
the industry-specific problem. In markets where apparently threatening language
(of a cease-and-desist letter, for example) does not deter entry, the causation
requirement would filter out litigation. After all, if the patentee's threat does not
actually cause the competitor to exit the market (or reduce its sales), then it has
suffered no cognizable antitrust injury. In contrast, in industries where threats are
worded in an apparently benign manner, but such softly coded threats are
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (rejecting a Walker Process claim at summary judgment, in part, for failure
to show relevant market).
197. See, e.g., Forbro Design Corp. v. Raytheon Co., 532 F.2d 758, 765 (1st Cir. 1976)
(holding no Walker Process liability because there was no proof of patentee's market
power).
198. Buehler AG v. Ocrim, S.p.A., 836 F. Supp. 1305, 1325-26 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
199. See Leslie, supra note 24, at 133-34.
200. Kockums Indus. Ltd. v. Salem Equip., Inc., 561 F. Supp. 168, 173 (D. Or. 1983)
("[A] good faith infringement suit will not violate the antitrust laws even though the patent
proves to be invalid.").
201. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 807 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
202. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1273
(8th Cir. 1980); Rogers Corp. v. Arlon, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 560, 571 (D. Conn. 1994)
("Defendant has not produced evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude
that the patent was fraudulently obtained, or that plaintiff brought or maintained this lawsuit
in bad faith or with an intent to monopolize."); Meurer, supra note 88, at 539-40 ("The
Walker Process theory has limited utility because it is difficult to prove fraudulent patent
procurement.").
203. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 756 F.2d 411, 416 (5th Cir. 1985)
("To recover in a private antitrust action the plaintiff must prove a violation of the antitrust
laws and must further prove that the violation caused damage.").
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understood and deter market entry, the causation requirement would allow the
antitrust claim to proceed. The causation requirement also rationalizes the scope of
damages. If a competitor does not leave the market (and does not suffer a reduction
in sales), it could bring a Walker Process claim (or counterclaim if sued for
infringement) but it would not receive antitrust damages. 20 4 If the antitrust plaintiff
did suffer a reduction in sales attributable to the monopolist's patent fraud, these
are appropriately labeled antitrust injuries and are recoverable and trebled. In short,
the causation element protects patentees from frivolous antitrust suits.
The enforcement requirement of a Walker Process claim need not be viewed
extremely narrowly in order to protect innocent patentholders from frivolous
claims; the elements of monopoly power, patent invalidity, proof that the patentee
committed fraud, and, finally, causation offer such protection. Empirically, courts
have no trouble dismissing Walker Process claims or granting summary judgment
to patentee-defendants based on these elements. 20 5 A narrowly drawn enforcement
definition, however, does not appropriately distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate Walker Process claims. Rather, the narrowly drawn enforcement
requirement provides a roadmap for bad actors to potentially monopolize with
impunity.
In sum, properly designed antitrust law does not upset the patent system. First,
owners of valid patents have little to fear from antitrust law. They can enjoy their
full panoply of patent rights without incurring antitrust liability. While there is
always a risk of false positives, they seem relatively unlikely given the many
elements that an antitrust plaintiff must prove. 206 To the extent that false positives
are perceived as a problem, the risk can be addressed through heightened
evidentiary standards. 20 7 Second, patent enforcement currently entails a significant
risk of facing an antitrust lawsuit. Infringement suits today routinely draw Walker
Process counterclaims. 20 8 There is no evidence to suggest that the perceived
inevitability of an antitrust counterclaim has reduced either relevant research or
patenting activity. Thus, there is little reason to believe that expanding the legal
definition of patent enforcement for antitrust claims would provide a meaningful
disincentive to those inventors seeking to acquire and assert valid patents. Third, to
the extent that current enforcement definitions are sometimes unclear and
inconsistent, even holders of valid patents would benefit from a more precise and
accurate legal conception of patent enforcement.
D. Decoupling Antitrust Law from the Declaratory Judgment Standard
Currently, the Walker Process enforcement requirement is tethered to
nonantitrust law. Federal courts initially caused the problem by defining patent
enforcement for Walker Process claims by reference to the declaratory judgment
204. A successful Walker Process claimant would receive reasonable attorneys' fees.
205. See, e.g., 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, DONALD F. TURNER, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN
L. SOLOW, ANTIrRUST LAW 335 (2d ed. 2000) (citing cases). If these filters are not
sufficient, then they should be beefed up.
206. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
207. See Leslie, supra note 24, at 179.
208. See supra text accompanying note 169.
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standard for challenging patent validity. 2°9 As courts contracted their jurisdiction to
hear declaratory judgment suits against patentees, the Walker Process enforcement
element consequently became harder to satisfy. Because federal courts linked the
legal tests, flaws in patent law's jurisdictional test were visited upon antitrust
jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court in Walker Process suggested that the declaratory judgment
standard should be easier to satisfy than the enforcement requirement. 210 This
would be true if the declaratory judgment standard were merely a jurisdictional
hurdle. However, according to some scholars and jurists, the Federal Circuit in the
declaratory judgment area has conflated constitutional doctrine with prudential
principles. For example, Professor Lisa Dolak has explained that when denying
standing to plaintiffs pursuing declaratory judgments against patentees, federal
"courts have often decided cases on jurisdictional grounds when the underlying
facts have principally or exclusively prudential significance." 21' Perhaps not
surprisingly, the Federal Circuit in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc.
denied that its now-rejected two-part test was prudential rather than
constitutional.21 2 In his dissent from the court's denial of Teva's petition for
rehearing, however, Judge Gajarsa noted, "The Teva court ignores [relevant]
precedent and reads general infringement policy considerations into Article III,
where they do not belong."21 3 Consequently, the Federal Circuit confused its well-
intentioned desire to protect patentholders from frivolous litigation with its
jurisdictional power to hear patent disputes. As Professor Dolak persuasively
argues, "protecting patent owners, a concededly laudable objective, ought to be
regarded as a matter of legislative or judicial policy. It definitely is not a matter of
the federal courts' constitutional power."214 This stilted reading of courts'
constitutional authority in the declaratory judgment context simultaneously
transformed substantive antitrust law in a manner that could allow holders of
fraudulently procured patents to restrain competition while avoiding antitrust
liability.
In theory, the Supreme Court's directive in MedImmune to loosen the
declaratory judgment standard in patent cases should improve the position of
Walker Process plaintiffs. However, instead of addressing the problems discussed
209. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
210. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176
(1965) ("In fact, one need not await the filing of a threatened suit by the patentee; the
validity of the patent may be tested under the Declaratory Judgment Act.") (citation
omitted).
211. Lisa A. Dolak, Power or Prudence: Toward a Better Standard for Evaluating Patent
Litigants'Access to the Declaratory Judgment Remedy, 41 U.S.F. L. REv. 407, 408 (2007).
212. 395 F.3d 1324, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
213. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 405 F.3d 990, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Gajarsa,
J., dissenting); see Dolak, supra note 206, at 419 ("As discussed below, Judge Gajarsa is
right. The Federal Circuit's declaratory judgment jurisprudence has been inconsistent and
ambiguous with respect to the distinction between jurisdiction-the power of the lower
federal courts to hear declaratory judgment cases--and the appropriate role of policy
considerations--the prudence of allowing a particular declaratory judgment action to go
forward.").
214. Dolak, supra note 211, at 429.
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in Part III by fixing the shortcomings in the Federal Circuit's declaratory judgment
jurisprudence, courts should define patent enforcement for Walker Process claims
independently. This would require decoupling substantive antitrust law from the
declaratory judgment standard in patent cases. Such decoupling is appropriate
because the declaratory judgment standard in patent validity cases and the
enforcement element in Walker Process litigation serve entirely different functions.
The declaratory judgment standard should define the constitutional threshold for
whether the plaintiff has presented a case or controversy sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on a federal court. The standard is a screening mechanism to prevent
inappropriate attacks on patent validity and forestall courts from issuing advisory
opinions. In contrast, the Walker Process patent enforcement requirement is not
about jurisdictional power. In Walker Process litigation, a case or controversy
clearly exists: the underlying alleged antitrust violation. The antitrust plaintiff is not
seeking a declaration of patent invalidity; she is suing for damages caused by the
defendant's alleged Section Two violation. Instead of serving a jurisdictional
function, the Walker Process enforcement requirement provides a proxy for
exclusionary effects and should be defined in order to serve that purpose.
To the extent that the declaratory judgment standard in patent validity cases is
used to filter out frivolous suits, that standard need not be imported into Walker
Process litigation because antitrust law has its own screens to protect firms from
frivolous litigation and false positives. The antitrust plaintiff must plead and
sufficiently allege several elements beyond mere patent invalidity. For example,
she must allege that the patent was acquired by fraud, that the defendant has
monopoly power in a relevant market, and that she has suffered antitrust injury. As
courts have shown an increasing willingness to dismiss antitrust claims using
screens that are part of substantive antitrust law, 215 Walker Process litigation need
not rely on patent law to protect defendants from frivolous antitrust suits.
In sum, it makes little sense to import an ill-defined quasi-jurisdictional test
from patent law into the substantive body of antitrust law, particularly since the
requirement of enforcement serves different goals in the different contexts. If the
patent enforcement requirement is to exist at all,216 federal courts should ask
whether the patentee has taken any actions that exclude competitors from the
market.2t 7 The plaintiffs need to satisfy the remaining elements of a Walker
Process claim sufficiently insure that the case is properly before the court.
CONCLUSION
Despite the potentially high number of fraudulently procured patents in the
American marketplace, courts and scholars have paid scant attention to the effect of
these patents on competitive dynamics. There is a general belief that fraudulently
procured patents, like other invalid patents, impose social costs; indeed, the modem
examination system was established in response to the "disastrous experience with
215. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007); Verizon
Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
216. See Leslie, supra note 24, at 182 (advocating elimination of the enforcement
requirement).
217. See supra Part Ill.
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a patent registration system run amuck" issuing bad patents. 21s The primary social
cost of fraudulently procured patents is that they can confer market power, which
allows the patentee to reduce production and charge a monopoly price, creating
inefficient dead-weight loss. While much is made about the tension between
antitrust and patent law, they should not be in conflict when it comes to the issue of
fraudulently procured patents. Neither area of law values such patents. Both areas
of law benefit from the removal of such patents from the marketplace. One can
believe in broad patent rights but still support antitrust liability for a monopolist
knowingly possessing a fraudulently procured patent that provides a causal link in
its maintenance of monopoly power.
The definition of patent enforcement plays a critical role in antitrust
jurisprudence. But to date it has received insufficient judicial and scholarly
attention. If patentees can use a fraudulently procured patent to deter market entry
without satisfying the enforcement element of a Walker Process claim as currently
defined, then firms can use their patents to illegally monopolize while insulating
themselves from antitrust liability.
In sum, monopolists with fraudulently procured patents should not be able to
harness the exclusionary power of their patents with impunity. For the purposes of
Walker Process liability, patent enforcement should include actions by a
patentholder that communicate an intent to enforce its patent against perceived
infringers. A more realistic definition of patent enforcement would, depending on
context, include public threats, prior infringement litigation, touting one's patent to
competitors, threats and insinuations directed to competitors' business partners, and
licensing activity. If the holders of fraudulently procured patents can exclude rivals
without risking antitrust liability, competition is injured without any countervailing
increase in innovation. Unless patent enforcement is defined more broadly, the law
creates a safe harbor for the potentially exclusionary acts of those who would use
fraudulently procured patents in a predatory manner.
218. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 593
(1999).
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